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Utilizing pooled cross—sectional and time series data an
econometric model is used to estimate the impact defense
expenditures had on state economic growth between 1976 and
1985. De-fense contracts for procurement, research and
development, services, and construction were -found to have a
significant positive e-f-fect on state growth during this
period. However, de-fense expenditures for civilian payrolls
were found to have had a significant adverse effect on
growth and expenditures on military payrolls were found to
be insignificantly related to state growth.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. DEFENSE SPENDING AND REGIONAL GROWTH
Defense spending in the United States is often considered
the classic example of a public good. The government takes
funds from the private sector via taxation and provides a
national defense. Expenditures for defense are not usually
considered a policy tool for encouraging economic growth. On
this subject one study found that during the 1970 's defense
expenditures have slowed the economic performance of the
United States compared to other western industrialized
nations CRef. l:p. 41D.
The Pentagon is the largest single purchaser of goods and
services in the economy CRef. 2: p. IID. Defense purchases
differ from transfer payments, the other major category of
federal expenditure. Transfer payments typically go to
anyone who qualifies and even though there Are patterns of
transfers among the states their impact is relatively
geographically diffused. In contrast, defense expenditures
directly affect a specific area where a military base is
located or a contract awarded. So, while providing a public
good national defense also has an incidental effect on
individual state economies.
The Commerce Department recently cited defense
expenditures as one of the contributing factors in the
reversal of a trend toward reduced differentials in regional
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per capita income. Up until 1979 there had been a trend
towards equalization in per capita income among regions. The
Southeast region o-f the United States was the only region
more than 5 percent below the national average with a per
capita income 15 percent below the average. In 1979 the
dif-ferences in per capita income between the richest and
poorest regions were the smallest since 1929, when the
government began keeping income statistics. CRe-f. 3]
By 1986 this 50 year trend had reversed. The Southeast,
Rocky Mountain, and Southwest regions all had per capita
incomes 10 percent or more below the national average.
Additionally, for the first time ever, the Great Lakes region
had fallen below the national average. Meanwhile New England
and the Far-West regions have seen their per capita incomes
continue to increase. CRef. 3D
Defense spending was only one of the causes cited by the
Commerce Department in the increased regional differences in
economic growth. Decline of the traditional smokestack
industries, energy production and farming in the Central and
Southern portions of the United States, as well as coastal
area growth in high technology and service industries, also
contributed. But given that defense expenditures help some
regions grow faster than others, the incidental impact of
those expenditures on regional and state economies should not
be considered unimportant. This study examines defense
expenditures for individual states over the last decade and
analyzes the signi-f icance oi those expenditures on state
economic growth.
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
To analyze the impact o-f de-fense expenditures a
statistical model of state economic growth was constructed.
Pooled time series and cross-sectional data over a ten year
period -from 1976 to 1985 were examined. Personal income -for
the 48 contiguous United States was used as a measure o-f
state economic growth. Federal expenditures -for defense, and
individual state characteristics are used as explanatory
variables in the growth model. State characteristics include
expenditures, taxes, business climate and geographic
vari ables.
This thesis is an extension o-f a thesis completed in
June 1987 by LT Brian Finch titled THE EFFECT OF DEFENSE
SPENDING ON STftTE ECONOMIC GRQUiTH . Finch used two methods
o-f analysis to examine de-fense expenditure impacts; an
interstate export model and a statistical analysis similar to
the one done in this thesis. He found that total defense
procurement dollars did have a positive and significant
effect on total personal income. CRef. 4: p. 473 Other
findings from that thesis Are presented in Chapter III.
This thesis looks at economic growth both on a total
personal income basis (the same approach used in LT Finch's
model) and on a per capita income basis. The time period
analyzed is expanded from six to ten years and additional
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explanatory variables are introduced into the growth model.
Most importantly, defense expenditures are broken up into
procurement contracts, service contracts and construction
contracts. Also, additional defense expenditure explanatory
variables for research and development contracts, military
payrolls and civilian payrolls are included in this model.
C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Two variations of the same growth model were used to
analyze the impact of defense expenditures on state growth.
The first used total personal income as a proxy for volume
growth of state economies. The second used per capita
personal income as a proxy for welfare growth of state
economies.
In the volume growth variant of the model all four
categories of defense contracts had a significant positive
effect on state growth. These categories of contracts were
procurement, research and development, services, and
construction. Surprisingly, payrolls for civilian employees
of the Department of Defense were found to have a significant
adverse effect on state growth. Military payrolls also had a
negative effect on growth, but the relationship was
statistically insignificant.
The second model tested the impact of defense spending on
welfare growth as measured by growth in per capita income and
showed somewhat different results. All defense expenditures
far payrolls and contracts were found to have a positive
influence on state growth, but only procurement contracts and
research and development contracts Mere statistically signi-
ficant- These results are discussed in depth in Chapter V.
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The next chapter describes defense spending. Different
categories of expenditures and their effects are discussed.
Additionally, the impact these various types of expenditures
Mould be expected to have on state economic groMth is
presented.
Chapter III reviews the literature on regional growth and
develops the theoretical frameMork for the study. Several
econometric study results Are discussed and evaluated. The
measures of economic growth of a region or a state are
discussed, as well as specific factors expected to influence
groMth.
Chapter IV presents the statistical methods and model
used in this study. The independent variables used in the
study, and their reason for inclusion in the model, are
discussed. Sources for the data and some known shortcomings
Are listed.
Chapter V presents the analysis of the data. Possible
causal relationships between the results and the real world
Are discussed. Statistical problems inherent in the model
and methods used are described.
Chapter VI is a summary of the study. Conclusions and




The previous chapter re-ferred to defense expenditure
impacts on state economies as incidental to the purpose of
the expenditures. This does not mean that the impacts are
unimportant or unintended. The Congressional authorization
and appropriation process that decides how and where defense
dollars are spent assures proper political consideration of
defense spending impacts.
Why is this political consideration important? Many
members of Congress feel that defense expenditures can be
used as a tool for remedying economic problems within
specific areas [Ref. 5: p. 1543. In these members' minds,
contract awards should include not only price and performance
considerations, but also state and region studies of
employment, with award preference given to declining or
stagnant regions. This attitude cause defense planners to be
conscious of the political realities of defense expenditures
and aware of the economic impact these expenditures have on a
state's or region's economy. Specifically, defense
expenditures will have direct, indirect and induced impacts
on a state's economy CRef. 6: pp. 79—83].
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B. IMPACTS OF EXPENDITURES
Direct impacts are the most visible and easily measured
of the three types of economic impacts on an economy.
Frequently, Mhen a politician is considering what a defense
contract will do for his district direct impacts are the only
type discussed. These impacts are equal to the initial
dollars spent on defense within a state, and the magnitude of
these impacts can be measured by the size of the expenditure.
Any expenditure in a state by a DQD installation will exert a
direct impact on the economy of that state. Additionally,
any defense contract for goods or services within a state
exerts a direct impact. For instance, in 1985 defense
expenditures (or the direct impact for service contracts) in
Ohio were *396 billion CRef. 71. This is by no means the sum
total of the economic impacts of these service contracts on
Ohio. To measure the total effect of defense spending other
kinds of impacts must be considered.
When direct expenditures are made the producer of the
goods and services must in turn buy goods and services from
other businesses, and employ additional labor, as inputs to
their own product. The employment of these resources produce
a ripple effect in the state economy as the seller of the
equipment must also buy goods, services and labor in order to
provide that equipment. So the direct impacts result in
indirect impacts on the state economy.
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The magnitude o-f the indirect impacts will continue to
diminish with each iteration or ripple as expenditures fan
out in the state's economy. While these dollar magnitudes
diminish, the sum of all the indirect impacts may be very
significant and must be taken into account when considering
total defense spending impact on a state. Data Resources
Incorporated estimated total direct and indirect defense
spending in dollars for each state in 1981 CRef. B:p. 3].
Table 1 is a summary of their findings.
There Are two problems when measuring the indirect impact
of defense spending on a state. One problem is that each
successive round of expenditures within a state's economy is
subject to leakage of expenditures to other states. This is
due to the fact that states have open economies, unlike the
national economy. In the national economy, excepting foreign
imparts, adding all of the indirect expenditures will result
in the total indirect impact on the nation. Import
quantities into the United States Are relatively easy to
determine. But, since a state has open borders, some of the
inputs used in production will come from outside the state
making quantities involved difficult to determine. In
measuring the indirect impacts only the expenditures inside a
state should be totalled. This means that for a state the
sum of all inputs does not necessarily constitute the
indirect impact of a direct expenditure.
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TABLE 1
DIRECT AND INDIRECT COMPONENTS OF DEFENSE SPENDING IN 19S1
(billions o-f dollars)
State Di^rect iadLCect iQtal^
Alabama 2.2 2.4 4.6
Arizona 0.9 0.3 1.2
Arkansas 0^8 1^3 2^1
California 25.5 17.5 42.9
Colorado 2.3 2.3 4.6
Connect Lcyt 4^2 2^9 7^1
Delaware 0.4 0.4 0.8
Florida 6.6 5.6 12.2
Gegrgi_a 3^6 3^3 ^i.?
Idaho 0.3 .4 .7
Illinois 3.3 8.2 11.5
Indiana 2^7 4^5 7^1
Iowa 0.6 1.6 2.2
Kansas 1.9 2.2 4.1
Kentucky i^4 2j^0 3^4
Louisiana 2.6 4.4 7.0
Maine 0.7 0.6 1.3
Maryl^and 3^8 2^4 6^2
Massachusetts 3.9 4.1 8.0
Michigan 1.9 5.7 7.6
Minnesota 1.^3 2^6 3^9
Mississippi 1.7 1.3 3.0
Missouri 4.0 3.1 7.1
Montana 0^2 0^5 0^7
Nebraska 0.8 0.8 1.6
Nevada 0.5 0.5 1.0
Nsw_HamQshi_re 0^Z 0^^ ii-3
New Jersey 2.8 5.2 8.0
New Mexico 1.1 0.8 1.9
New_Ygrk 7^2 ii^i Iii.3
North Carolina 2.8 3.7 6.6
North Dakota 0.4 0.3 0.8
OhLQ 3^.7 8^2 ii^?
Oklahoma 2.0 2.8 4.8
Oregon 0.5 1.5 2.0
PeQQsyLv^QL^ 4^1 8^6 k'^z.Z
Rhode Island 0.5 0.7 1.1
South Carolina 2.2 1.9 4.1
Sguth_Dakota 0^3 0^3 0^.6
Tennessee 1.2 2.9 4.1
Texas 10.9 14.7 25.7
Utah 1^0 0^9 1^9
'v'ermont 0.5 0.3 0.8
Virginia 8.7 3.1 11.8
y^l;lllLQ3tQQ ^i.1 3^2 Zi.3
West Virginia 0.2 1.3 1.5
Wisconsin 0.8 3.0 3.8
W^om^ng 0^2 fd^h 0^8
(Source: Data Resources Inc. CRef. 83)
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Subcontracting de-fense work causes a second problem in
measuring indirect impacts. When a subcontract goes outside
the state where the original prime contract was awarded, the
total indirect impact on a state is less than when it is
awarded within the state. Additionally, in the other state
where the subcontract work takes place the dollars spent are
e-f -f ecti vely direct impacts on that state. These subcontracts
will then generate their own indirect impacts on that state.
These two problems in measuring indirect impacts will not
be considered in this thesis. It will be assumed that all
expenditures remain within the state where the direct
expenditure occurred. These two problems have different
effects overall. Production inputs coming from outside the
state will tend to diffuse defense dollars, spreading them
out over several states. However, studies of subcontracting
indicate that the geographic distribution of subcontracts are
even more concentrated in particular states then DOD prime
contracts. One 1968 study found that the top ten states for
prime contracts had 61.3 percent of the total contract value
CRef. 103. The same ten states had 76.4 percent of the
subcontract value over the same period. Another study
conducted six years later found basically the same results.
The leading ten states in subcontracts received three—fourths
of the awards, while the top ten in prime contracts received
two-thirds. California and New York alone accounted for two-
fifths of the total value of subcontract awards
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CRe-f. 2:p. 1163. In 1979 the same type of analysis -found
seventy—five percent o-f the subcontracts Mere performed in
only ten states CRef. 1: p. 10D.
One other type of impact must be considered in measuring
the total effect of defense expenditures on a state. These
Are the induced impact of payrolls. Employees of firms
receiving direct and indirect expenditures are paid an
income. This income is then used to purchase consumer goods
and services Mithin the state. The magnitude of induced
impacts depends on the size of the payroll, the labor
intensity of the industry receiving the direct and indirect
expenditures, and the consumption functions of local
households, which determines their propensity to consume
within the state where they work CRef. 6: p. SI 3.
Frequently, indirect and induced impacts are referred to
as the multiplier effects of the direct expenditures. A
state with a multiplier of two would expect to see a million
dollars of direct expenditures have an additional impact of
two million dollars on the state's economy. The total of the
three impacts, direct, indirect, and induced will be the
ultimate effect of defense spending on a state.
When considering defense spending it is also important to
differentiate the type of expenditures. Three categories of
expenditures will be analyzed: military payroll, civilian
payroll and defense contracts. Each of these three
categories have different indirect and induced impacts and
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-for that reason should be considered separately Mhen
discussing de-fense expenditure e-f-fects.
Civilian payroll is composed o-f the wages paid to
civilian employees o-f the Department of De-fense. The direct
impact is measured by the size o-f the payroll itsel-f. There
are no indirect impacts of this type of expenditure. The
induced impacts Mill be the additional demand caused by the
employees' expenditures within a state. It includes
multiplier effects of their consumption, new housing
investment, private investment and public goods consumption
and investment CRef. 5: p. 157].
Military payroll is considered separate from civilian
payroll. Mhile the direct impact on a state is still the
size of the payroll, the induced effects are expected to be
substantially different. Military families typically have
access to separate exchange and commissary facilities, which
provide consumption goods often purchased outside the state.
They also Are provided services such as medical and dental
care^ recreation facilities, and military base housing. From
the public sector standpoint military personnel often pay
state income taxes outside the state where they are residing.
The expected result is induced impacts of military payrolls
on a state being significantly smaller than that of civilian
payrolls. CRef. 5: p. 1691
Contract expenditures will have all three of the impacts
discussed. The direct impact will be the contracted cost of
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the procured item. The indirect impacts are the purchases
from all firms producing and selling inputs to the -final
producers. The induced impacts are the employee payrolls
plus pro-fits o-f owners o-f all -firms receiving direct or
indirect impacts and have the same induced e-f-fect on a state
as DOD civilian payrolls. CRef. 5:p. 1573
There seem to be few in depth studies looking at the
e-ffect o-f a new de-fense de-fense contract on a region. The
tendency is to treat the impact the same as an increase in
basic civilian industries. The multiplier e-f-fect in a
specific region causes the same increase independent of
whether it was a defense or a civilian induced expansion.
However, one study of Wichita, Kansas provides an indication
that this assumption is incorrect.
Typically, for every 100 employees added to its basic
manufacturing companies, Michita has experienced an increase
in the local work force of 150 employees. Michita,
therefore, is believed to have an employment multiplier o-f
1.5 CRef. 2:p. 1173.
Mhen a specific one—shot contract was issued to Boeing
for the production of a few Boeing bombers a detailed study
was conducted of the Wichita sreai. The study concluded that
the actual local work force increase for a DOD contract was
far below the expected civilian industry multiplier of 1.5.
The results indicated the multiplier was somewhere between
0.25 and 0.20 and was not considered unusual for a defense
IB
procurement multiplier. The study cited several possible
causes -for the low multiplier. One hypothesis was that local
industry had overexpanded during the preceding boom period
and because o-f excess production capacity could easily handle
the Boeing increases. Another was that some o-f the local
businessmen, accustomed to the defense spending ups and downs
at the Boeing plant, questioning how long the employment
increase would last were reluctant to expand capacity and
increase stocks. The same up and down tendency in defense
spending also was believed to cause Boeing employees to have
a high propensity to save for the slack periods, knowing the
high-paying defense work might be temporary CRef. 2: p. 118].
The end result is that defense spending in a region will
have a unique effect on a state economy, often totally
different from civilian and other government spending. Many
factors shape the effects of defense spending on an
individual state. Most important Are the direct impact (or
size of the defense expenditures) in that state, the
composition of the expenditures between payrolls and contract
categories, and the location of major defense industries and
military installations in the state. Other important factors
Are the size and degree of diversification of the state's
industry, the extent of vertical integration within the
defense contractors, and the competitive position of those
contractors compared to other states' defense contractors
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CRef. 10: p. 23. This makes projections o-f de-fense
expenditure effects within a region or state very difficult-
C. DEFENSE AND NATIONAL GROWTH
Ef-fects of defense spending on the entire United States
economy have been studied in depth. Most studies indicate
that defense spending has an overall negative impact on the
economic growth of the nation. This negative impact results
from the real cost of defense, i.e. the cost of human and
natural resources and the productive capital being used to
provide the national defense. Not only does production of
civilian goods and services suffer, but resources that would
have potentially been used to increase economic growth, are
used instead to maintain military stockpiles. An example of
this is the production of a missile.
For example, the same amount of economic activity that
went into the production, transportation, and maintenance of
a missile could have been used to upgrade the nation's
railroads. These railroads would continue to enhance the
nation's productive capacity, unlike the missile that is
either blown up or dismantled CRef. 2:p. 293.
If the economy is near full employment then defense
spending paid for by taxation and deficit spending will be at
the expense of private investment. Taxed income cannot be
saved and invested in capital. Deficit spending means the
government is bidding resources away from other uses that
26)
could be available to borrow for capital investments.
CRe-f. ll:p. 106D
The Council on Economic Priorities, an independent
nonpro-fit research organization, conducted two studies on the
economic result o-f de-Fense spending on the United States'
economy. One study compared economic growth in several
western industrial countries, while the other looked
specifically at the U.S. employment impacts of defense
spending CRef. l:pp. 6—57D.
The study on economic growth compared the performance of
seventeen western industrial countries over the past twenty
years. Several statistical tests were done on a variety of
economic indicators to determine the impact of higher real
defense expenditures. The results indicate the heavier
defense expenditures of the United States contributed to
reduced economic and productivity growth compared to other
industrial nations. The Council believes this is one of the
reasons the economic gap separating America from the rest of
the world was closed so fast during the 1960 's and 1970 s.
Several specific examples are cited. Defense spending on
high technology military products kept engineers from
competing effectively with the Japanese in development of
consumer electronic products. While most nations expanded
exports during these two decades, the United States became
more dependent for defense raw materials, energy and consumer
goods. Heavier defense spending in the United States, while
other nations concentrated on increasing industrial strength,
is believed to be the cause CRef. l:p. 53D.
The other study started -from the premise that de-fense
spending creates jobs. The study then compared military
spending Mith other types o-f spending to see if as many Jobs
Mere created per dollar spent and how occupational categories
with high unemployment were a-f-fected. The results indicate
that military spending is not an e-f-fective jobs program.
Fewer jobs are created than most major industries' spending
the same dollar amount. De-fense typically employs highly
skilled people who have little trouble finding work.
Military expenditures are highly concentrated in a few
regions and do not effectively spread money when trying to
reduce unemployment. An important conclusion of the study is
that military spending is an ineffective way for the United
States to solve national employment and economic problems.
CRef. l:p. 153 One criticism of this study is that it did
not consider military personnel. This type of defense
employment via military enlistments is often considered an
alternative for poorly skilled, unemployed people. The
inclusion of defense spending for military personnel may have
found a different result than that reached by the study.
To help evaluate the size and impact of defense spending
the Congressional Research Service compiled the following
statistics for 1983; national defense outlays were :$225.8
billion or approximately seven percent of the Gross National
22
Product. These expenditures were divided among different
categories of defense spending with thirty-nine percent going
to weapons procurement, research and development and
construction; twenty—seven percent to personnel compensation;
twenty-eight percent to operations and maintenance; and five
percent to international affairs. CRef. 12:p. 323
1983 was a year of economic stagnation, but during that
year defense outlays grew 9.6 percent. Leading this growth
was a 17.5 percent growth in spending for military hardware
and construction. This military spending accounted for
roughly twenty percent of the total United States
manufacturing and construction industry output of durable
goods. Other significant industries were aerospace,
shipbuilding and ordinance where defense accounted for forty
to sixty percent of the gross output. In the electrical
equipment, primary metals, and petroleum industries defense
accounted for five to eleven percent of the output. So, for
specific industries defense was the major customer during
this recessionary period. CRef. 12:p. 333
D. DEFENSE AND THE STATES
Significant to this thesis is the highly regional
concentration of the defense industries. Heavy
concentrations of the aerospace industries occur in
California, Washington and Texas. Shipbuilding is
concentrated in the coastal states of Virginia, Connecticut,
Mississippi, Louisiana, Washington and California. The
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ordinance industry is located primarily in New England and
the North-Central industrial states.
Tmo methods oi looking at the regional dispersion of
de-fense spending will be shoMn. These Are presented to shoM
hoM concentrated de-fense spending is in some states and why
defense dollars are expected to be very important to economic
growth in those states.
The -first method for evaluating defense expenditures uses
a total of military and civilian payrolls and defense
contracts for goods and services greater than ten thousand
dollars for each state. This sum is then divided by the total
state private non—farm industry income. This ratio is meant
to give a relative picture of the difference in importance of
defense expenditures to each state's economy. The results of
this comparison for 1981 are presented in Table 2. There is
substantial variation in the ratio of defense spending to
private income among the states. Virginia ranked first with
a ratio of 28.9 percent; over 10 percent above the second
ranking state of Connecticut. Adjacent to the highest
ranking state of Virginia, West Virginia had the poorest
showing with a ratio of only one percent.
The second method of illustrating the relative importance
of defense spending across states was developed by the
Council on Economic Priorities, and presents the relative
state ranking of the net impact of defense spending per
worker. This was found by calculating the amount of taxes
24
TABLE 2
STATE RANKING OF DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
CORPORATE INCOME IN 1981 (Billions of Dollars)
Defense Corporate Defense
State SQendi^ng income Percentage
1 Virginia 8.0 27.7 28.9%
2. Connecticut 4.6 25.2 18.37.
_3^_Mi.ssissi^BBi^ li^7 10^.2 i^^Zl-
4. Missouri 4.9 29.4 16.77.
5. Maryland 3.3 23.5 14.07.
_6i._New_Mexi^co 0^8 6^0 i3s.3X
7. Louisiana 3.4 26.3 12.97.
8. Washington 3.2 26.3 12.27.
_?^_Caii.iQCQL^ 20^1 i^Q^i 11^?'^
10. South Carolina 1.7 14.9 11.47.
11. Maine 0.6 5.3 11.37.
1 2^_New_HamBsh Ice ^6 5^5 i?i?>:
13. Arizona 1.6 15.1 10.67.
14. Kansas 1.5 14.1 10.67.
i5^_Utah 05.8 7^6 10^5X
16. Massachusetts 4.0 39.9 10.07.
17. Texas 10.3 102.6 10.07.
i8^_Al^bama 1-^7 17^9 ?^5X
19. Delaware 0.4 4.3 9.37.
20. Georgia 2.8 30.4 9.27.
21^_NQrth_Dakota 0^3 3^4 8^8*/,
22. Florida 4.5 52.6 8.67.
23. North Carolina 2.5 31.0 8.17.
24^_0kLahoma 1^5 18^8 8^0X
25. Vermont 0.2 2.6 7.77.
26. South Dakota 0.2 2.7 7.47.
2Zi._Rtl9de_I.sl.and 0^4 5^.5 Z^Z'A
28- Colorado 1.4 20.3 6.97.
29. Kentucky 1.1 17.6 6.37.
30i_Nebraska 0^5 8j^3 6j^0'>C
31. Indiana 2.0 33.9 5.97.
32. New Jersey 2.9 50.9 5.77.
33^_New_Ygrk 6^7 122^3 5i.5X
34. Nevada 0.3 6.3 4.87.
35. Idaho 0.2 4.4 4.57.
36^_0h i.g 3^2 70^5 4^5X
37. Pennsylvania 3.2 75.2 4.37.
38. Minnesota 1.1 26.4 4.27.
3?^_Arkansas 0^4 9^9 4^0'^
40. Tennessee 0.8 23.8 3.47.
41. Michigan 2.0 61.4 3.37.
42^_ILLlQQLS 25.2 80;.0 2,^ax
43. Montana 0.1 3.7 2.77.
44. Wyoming 0.1 3.8 2.67.
15;._Wi^scgnsLn 0^.7 28;.6 2;.4'^
46. Iowa 0.3 16.2 1.97.
47. Oregon 0.2 15.2 1.37.
48;._West_VLrgi,nLa 0;.! 9:.7 1^0>i
(Sources: Dept. of Defense and Dept. of Commerce)
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each state paid that Mere used -for defense, calculated
simply as a ratio o-f total U.S. defense spending to total
U.S. income taxes times the U.S. income tax received from the
state. Then a per capita rate was found by dividing the
state military tax by the state work force.
Defense spending in each state was divided by the state
work force to find the state defense expenditure per worker.
The difference between these two ratios (state defense
spending per worker and military tax per worker) is the net
economic stimulation from defense expenditures each state
received per worker. The Council's results for 1981 is
presented in Table 3. The greatest economic stimulation per
worker was in Virginia with a net defense spending of *2659
per worker, with the least in Qregon with a negative :S1036
per worker. CRef. l:p. 1613
E. DEFENSE IMPACT PROJECTIONS
Despite the difficulties in predicting the impact of
changes in defense expenditure on a state or region some
research has been done. In 1975 Roger Bezdek used a policy
simulation model to project the results of two possible
compensated shifts in defense expenditures on regional
manpower. He looked at a possible thirty percent increase or
decrease in defense expenditures and then forecast the 1980
percentage change in regional employment. CRef. 133
The results for the nation were similar to those on the
previously illustrated distribution of defense spending. A
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TABLE 3
STATE RANKING OF NET DEFENSE SPENDING PER WORKER IN 1981
($ per worker)
Defense De-fense Net
State Sgending Tax Burden ia}B#5t
1. Virginia 3970 1311 2659
2. Connecticut 3108 1625 1483
_3i_ytah 2327 10?6 1231
4. Mississippi 2178 968 1210
5. Missouri 2440 1312 1128
_6i_New_Mexica 2155 1129 1026
7. California 2376 1454 922
8. Louisiana 2132 1224 908
_?^_Washingtgn 2347 1448 899
10. Maryland 2195 1452 743
11. Arizona 1832 1155 677
12^_Massachusetts 1?81 1306 675
13. Texas 1910 1277 633
14. Oklahoma 1820 1197 6o sjl
1 5^_Gegrg i a 1 608 1 074 534
16. South Carolina 1526 1041 485
17. New Hampshire 1676 1199 477
lii_Cglgradg 1672 1226 446
19. Alabama 1595 1152 443
20. Maine 1493 1073 420
21^_Flgrida 1510 1252 258
22. Kansas 1476 1329 147
23. North Dakota 1324 1242 82
24^_Ngr th_Carg 1 i na 1030 1012 1
3
25. Delaware 1547 1537 10
26. Rhode Island 1143 1235 -92
27^_yermgnt 845 965 zl20
28. Nevada 1100 1243 -143
29. Kentucky 931 1136 -205
30i_Sguth_Pakgta 745 1064 z31?
31. Arkansas 651 990 -339
32. Indiana 897 1382 -485
33i_Wygming 832 1358 z526
34. New York 1011 1546 -535
35. Tennessee 596 1133 -538
36^_Nebraska 758 1298 z540
37. New Jersey 1069 1625 -556
38. Ohio 901 1463 -562
39^_ldahg 570 1140 z5Z0
40. Minnesota 694 1281 -587
41. Pennsylvania 826 1420 -594
42^_Mgntana 596 1236 z640
43. Wisconsin 351 1239 -888
44. Iowa 403 1374 -971
45i_Michigan 603 1602 z???
46. West Virginia 280 1295 -1015
47. Illinois 599 1630 -1031
48i_Dregon 285 1320 zl035
(Source: Council on Economic Priorities CRef. 13)
thirty percent decrease in de-Fense spending Mould likely
increase employment two percent nationally while a thirty
percent increase in de-fense spending would cause employment
to decrease about 1.3 percent. The impact on regions and
individual states varied considerably. Some states bene-fited
greatly by the decrease in de-fense spending while others
su-f + ered severe adverse e-f-fects. Middle Atlantic states such
as Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Midwestern states like
Illinois and Indiana, and New York state all saw employment
increases in the five percent range given a thirty percent
reduction in de-fense spending. The Mountain states and
California were projected to have about a one percent loss
in employment. An increase in expenditures caused the
reverse to happen with Cali-fornia and the Mountain states
gaining about one percent in employment while the Middle
Atlantic and Midwestern states lost about three percent.
States o-f three regions o-f the country—New England, Lower
South Atlantic, and East South Central—were projected to be
almost una-f-fected given either a rise or decrease in de-fense
spending. CRe-f. 13:p. 193D
Moving from the national level, the Congressional
Research Service (CRS) in 1985 examined the e-f-fects of
defense spending on the state of Mississippi. In fiscal year
1984 Mississippi received defense dollars totalling a little
over three million. N That was about 1.6 percent of the
national total with eighteen states receiving more. The
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emphasis in the CRS study Mas on the contribution of de-fense
to the total output and employment in Mississippi. CRe-f. 103
Mississippi's economy Mas not dominated by manu-f acturing
in 1984, Mith manufacturing only accounting for tMenty—five
percent of nonagri cul tural employment. Among non-
manufacturing industries the public sector Mas by far the
largest employer. State, Federal and local government
agencies accounted for a total of tMenty-three percent of the
nonagricul tural employment in the state. Defense spending in
the state folloMed the economy's structure. Tmo industries
received over fifty percent of defense dollars spent in the
state; shipbuilding received $1,016 million and DOD military
and civilian payrolls accounted for *840 million in 1984.
CRef. 10:p. 73
The study used tMo related measures to analyze defense
spending 's impact on economic activity in Mississippi. One
was the share of total state output accounted for by military
demand and the other was the contribution of defense spending
to total employment.
Defense spending in 1984 accounted for 7.6 percent of
total state output. In projecting defense expenditures to
1990 defense spending is expected to rise to 8.4 percent of
the total output. This projection of a ten percent increase
in the defense share of total output means that defense is
expected to be a stable source of economic groMth for
Mississippi for the rest of this decade. In fact, annual
projections for total state growth in output is at a rate o-f
3.1 percent, Mhile defense related output is projected to
grow at an annual rate o-f 4.7 percent. CRe-f. 10:p. 9]
In 1984, defense was estimated to account for 5.7 percent
of the total employment in Mississippi. CRB projections show
an increase of 20 percent by 1990 or a defense share of 6.9
percent of total state employment. Again, defense is
expected to be a major source of employment growth for the
rest of the eighties. Annual employment growth for
Mississippi is projected at an average annual rate of 1.4
percent compared to defense related employment growth at an
annual rate of 4.7 percent. CRef. 10:p. 113 All this points
out how significant defense spending can be to a state's
economic growth. In Mississippi defense is a prime
contributor to total output and employment growth.
Defense spending can have an even more significant impact
on a state subsystem such as a county or city. In an
econometric analysis of Philadelphia in 1977, Norman Glickman
studied the impact of a defense spending reduction. This
reduction was actually occurring due to decreases in activity
at the Defense Industrial Supply Center and the Philadelphia
Naval Base. The total direct impact of this reduction was
:$95 million in 1975. Projecting the total result of this
decrease resulted in total direct and indirect impacts of
tl6il million over an eight year period. The total impact on
manufacturing was almost immediate with nearly 80 percent
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recorded in the first year. Nonmanu-f actur ing activity
started with feeling almost no impact due to the decrease and
built to a total of $100 million after eight years. This
translates to a total $290 million loss in personal income.
CRef. 14:p. 180]
The political nature of such cuts can be readily seen.
Any region facing such a cut in defense spending will bring
whatever pressure possible to avoid taking that cut.
Additional defense spending is expected to have the opposite
growth effect on a region and causes these dollars to be
actively pursued.
The next chapter looks at how a state or region grows.
Several econometric models are reviewed to provide a basis




During the last decade states have grown at different
rates. In the long-run, differences in real wages and other
factor prices should disappear through trade and migration
across states. This should equalize per capita income. In
fact, as previously mentioned, this was the trend in per
capita income until 1979. But this trend has reversed and
differences in state growth are becoming more pronounced.
This apparent contradiction to economic theory has generated
interest in determining why states grow and why differences
in economic growth rates exist. This chapter will present
some of the facets of state economic growth with a major
portion devoted to a review of empirical models of regional
and state growth.
B. FACTORS OF GROWTH
The multiplier effects of a change in economic activity
were discussed in the previous chapter. In that context the
expected impact of changes in defense spending on state
economic growth was discussed. But the multiplier effect on
state growth goes beyond just defense spending. Any change
in state economic activity will set into motion a set of
associated actions that will impact on economic growth and
decl I r.e.
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This is illustrated in an example o-f how a state might
react to the development o-f a new resource in a relatively
unpopulated part of the state. This new resource could come
from any source: technology, discovery, or a change that
allows the production of a good to be profitable.
First, an investment would be made in resource
facilities. This investment would cause an immigration of
workers and their families. Community development of
facilities and services such as housing, roads, and public
utilities would take place. Transportation links between the
developing Area and the rest of the state would be improved.
This population growth would be expected to attract
businesses such as grocery and department stores and
restaurants. Along with the initial resource development
these would bring in materials suppliers and business
services.
All of this new construction and market growth would
continue to attract more workers, and further expansion of
the population would attract more business ventures. As the
initial mix of people and businesses becomes more complex
more specialty industries would be attracted. Additionally,
industries that require larger market areas would begin to be
drawn into the area. Transportation links to the area would
continue to improve. The growth of the area would also begin
to attract specialized services and financial sources.
These, in turn, would pull in businesses that look for these
services when making a location decision. GroMth Mould
continue as the region became more populated and exterior
demand stimulated even more production. CRef. 15:p. 953
This is only an example of economic growth. Not all
growth will follow a similar chain o-f events. If the area
was already densely populated the impact of new development
would not be as marked. Also, a shortage of labor could
drastically change the above sequence. The loss of an
industry would be expected to have the reverse effect on an
area. The impact on a state of economic change will in part
be determined by the multiplier effect and the growth or
decline sequence the change initiates. Also, there may be an
offset elsewhere in the state if new firms compete with
existing ones within the state. Most state growth models
attempt to explain differences in growth by studying factors
that might cause a resource to be developed. This is
supplemented by state characteristics such as fiscal policy,
business climate, and climatic conditions that would cause
the rate of growth (or decline) in one state to be different
from another.
Typically, in discussing state growth the differences
between a declining state and a growing state are relative.
During the last decade the United States experienced a period
of economic growth and in absolute terms most states also
grew. But in comparing states and regions to the national
growth averages, some states can be classified as declining.
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Another distinct difference betMeen state economic growth
rates is the difference between relative and absolute growth.
While per capita income in the South shows the greatest gain
relative to the rest of the nation, in absolute terms
Southern per capita income is still below that of the
Northern states.
There Are two basic measures of economic growth. One is
the change in the economic welfare of the individual. The
other is a change in a volume measure of economic activity.
CRef. 16:p. 12]
State economic growth in volume can be measured several
ways. Two typical measurement methods are employment growth
and total income growth. Growth occurring from expansion in
available labor force and consumer numbers cause both of
these indicators to hinge on population growth. Population
growth has not been equal throughout the United States. Some
areas of the Northeast have actually had declines in
population since 1976 CRef. 17:p- 33. Since birth rates in
the United States have, as a whole, been declining over the
last decade, most of the differences in population growth
between states are attributed to interstate migration. For
instance, between 1975 and 1980 seventeen percent of the
population growth in Western states was attributable to a net
i n-migrati on. In contrast, states in the North and East
Central regions had net out-migration rates that resulted in
a loss of 3.3 percent and 5.2 percent of their 1970
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population by 1980 CRef. 17:p. 103. These population changes
re-flect back on the di -f -f erences in employment and income
groMth between states. As might be expected the relative
gains in employment growth and total income growth as
indicators oi economic growth have mirrored regionally the
population results. There has been a decline in the North
and substantial gains in the South.
This exemplifies the difference between the welfare
aspects of economic growth and those of volume. States that
experience declining population and relative declines in
total income could still have an overall increase in the
welfare of the state's population as measured by per capita
i ncome.
The most commonly used measure of individual welfare is
the level of per capita income and changes in that level.
This is a crude indicator of economic welfare, showing an
individual's relative economic standing, as well as providing
a measure of improvement or decline in that standing. Per
capita income growth is determined by total income growth and
changes in papulation. Typically, per capita income growth
is used as the measure of economic growth when comparing
nations. Usually continual increases in population of a
country can be taken for granted. Due to restrictions in
migration between countries, population can provide a good
way to attach a numeric floor to economic growth. Even
though income or volume growth takes place in a country, if
it does not keep ahead o-f population growth the country is
not considered to be growing economically. CRef. 15:p. 97]
When per capita income is used to compare states the
migration restrictions are removed. Individuals can freely
move -from one location to another making population growth no
longer a given fact. As mentioned, over the last decades
population declines have occured in some states. In those
states, if total income remains the same, or even declines,
per capita income can still increase, creating a divergence
between volume growth and welfare growth. CRef. 15:p. 983.
The next section is a literature review of several state
economic growth models. They studied some measure of volume
or welfare growth or both. The models and the variables they
found to be significant in explaining state growth provided a
basis for the model of state growth used in this thesis.
C. MODELS OF STATE GROWTH
Most of the econometric models of state economic growth
are based on cross—sectional analysis. In this literature
differences between state economic volume and welfare
measures are related to across state variations in market and
cost variables hypothesized to affect the chosen economic
measure. A summary of the following growth models is
presented in Table 4. By far the most common theme is to
analyze state employment and manufacturing growth.
Plaut and Pluta (1983) examined manufacturing growth for
the 4S contiguous states for two separate periods; 1967-72
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and 1972.-71 . They used three dependent variables as measures
o-f growth: percentage changes in manu-f acturing value added,
in manu-f acturing employment, and in manu-f acturing capital
stocks. The explanatory variables include several measures
o-f accessibility to markets, cost and availability of -factors
o-f production, climate and other environmental factors, and
state business climate, which includes measures of state
taxes and expenditures.
Their analysis concluded that growth in manufacturing
employment is strongly related to climate and labor factors
such as wages, unemployment and union activity. For growth
in capital stock, energy and land costs were found to be the
most significant factors. Perhaps most unusual is the
study's conclusion that accessibility to markets is
relatively unimportant to state growth.
Among the explanatory variables, a poor business climate
with a high overall tax effort by the state was found to have
a significant negative impact on employment growth.
Education expenditures had a positive effect on employment
growth, while state welfare expenditures were found to be
insignificant. CRef . 18D
The Plaut and Pluta study received a lot of criticism due
to the conclusion that markets were relatively unimportant in
explaining state growth. One article by Leonard Mheat stated
that the reason for this result was that several other
variables in the study were serving as proxy variables for
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markets. These included the population density variable,
used as a land availability indicator, and an aridness
measure used as a climate indicator. Wheat felt the aridness
measure identified the -fast growing Southern and Western
markets from the rest of the nation, and that this market
proxy effect caused the variable to be significant. Also,
Wheat felt unemployment is a proxy for sIom growth and should
not have been included as an explanatory variable. He felt
this variable alone caused a significant distortion in Plaut
and Pluta's overall results. CRef. 193
Wheat (1973) had developed his own model of state
economic growth prior to Plaut and Pluta's article. His
study used absolute manufacturing growth, per capita growth
and percentage growth as the dependent variables. His
explanatory variables included measures of markets,
agglomeration, thresholds, urbanization, labor factors,
resources and climate. Wheat concluded markets were the most
significant determinant in state growth. Climate and labor
factors were also found to play an important part in
manufacturing gains. CRef. 203
In a subsequent study Wheat (1986) again analyzed the
percentage change in manufacturing employment. He included
the same explanatory variables as before plus variables for
state taxes, business climate, and retiree i n-mi grat i on. His
results were almost unchanged. Markets were the most
significant factor in explaining employment growth. In
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particular, total state income divided by manufacturing
employment was the most significant explanatory variable.
Wheat argued that this is a measure of the ratio of market
demand to market supply. Climate, as measured by maximum
July temperature, was the next most significant variable.
Percentage unionization and manufacturing wages were found to
have significant negative effects on employment growth.
Some of the variables that Mheat found to be
insignificant in his studies are surprising. Both state
taxes and business climate were found to be relatively
unimportant. Resource costs were also found to have a
negligible impact on employment growth. CRef. 213
Another study looking at growth in several manufacturing
industries was done by Newman (1983). As his dependent
variable he used the difference between state employment
growth and the national average of growth for thirteen
industry groups as well as pooling the industry results. His
independent variables were corporate taxes, change in
unionization, and a dummy variable representing states with
r i ght-to—wor k laws. The study found evidence that higher
corporate taxes negatively affected employment growth rates
and was especially important in explaining slow growth in
capital intensive industries. CRef. 223
Wasylenko and Mcguire (1985), in their article on state
employment growth, criticized other recent studies for
concentrating on manufacturing. They felt that, since the
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manu-f acturing sector has been shrinking in terms o-f
employment over the past decade it was a poor proxy to
measure state economic growth. They analyzed employment
growth across several industries using the percentage change
in manufacturing, transportation, communication and public
utilities, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance,
and real estate services, and then the total change in all
these industries combined as the dependent variable. Their
explanatory variables were measures of market access, labor
farce characteristics, energy prices, climate, business
climate, and agglomeration economies.
From the prospective of total employment growth they
found average industry wage rates to have a significant
negative impact on growth. Electricity costs and overall tax
efforts by the state also had important adverse effects. But
as a caveat to the negative tax effects if the state spends
the taxes on education the result is a positive impact on
employment growth. They point out that wages and energy
prices Are beyond the control of state policy makers and are
the largest contributors to low employment growth rates.
Increased state spending will not produce significant growth
in most states fighting slow growth because of the effect of
these variables. CRef . 233
Another common theme in explaining state growth is
examining reasons new firms choose to locate in a particular
state. Carlton (1979), in examining firm location choices.
looked at the importance o-f taxes and fiscal incentives. He
analyzed births of firms in Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (SMSA) from 1967 to 1975. His variables included
wages, labor supply, proximity to markets, unemployment
rates, a business climate index, and corporate, personal
income and property taxes.
Mages and electricity prices Mere found to have a
significant negative impact in firm location choices.
Carlton's results also indicated that taxes and business
climate played little or no role in state selection. The
existing amount of industrial activity, measured by the
agglomeration variable, had a large influence in the number
of new starts. CRef. 243
In a subsequent article, Carlton (1983) developed a model
linking SMSA location decisions and employment choices of new
branch plants. The employment choice represents the number
of new hires the plant would make. He again found energy
costs had a significant impact. Existing concentrations of
employment are very important especially to a firm locating a
relatively small plant. Taxes and state incentives again
played little role in firms' decisions. CRef. 253
Bartik (1985) also examined new plant location decisions
of firms. His decision variables represented energy prices,
taxes, labor costs, and agglomeration economies. His results
tend to contradict Carlton's. Bartik s study found that
corporate income taxes and unionization had a significant
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negative impact on firm location choices. Wage rates and
electricity cost were insignificant to the firms' decisions
in this study. He concurred with Carlton that agglomeration
economies were important. In particular employees per acre
and highway miles were found to be significant positive
factors in the state chosen. CRef. 26]
The differences in these two studies should be
emphasized. Carlton was looking at firms' decisions to
locate in a particular SMSA, while Bartik was examining
firms' decisions to locate in a particular state. Schmenner,
Huber , and Cook (1987) explain that a firm's decision on
where to locate a new plant is really a two-stage process.
In the first stage the firm decides to locate in one of a few
particular states. After the location choice has been
narrowed the second stage in the selection process is to
choose the actual location of the plant. Different variables
are important in each stage of the selection process.
Their study found that firms in the first stage of the
process place the most emphasis on avoiding unionism and
higher wages as well as higher spending states. Warmer
climates were preferred and in general firms favor location
in low population density areas. After the choice is
narrowed to a few states, unionism and labor wage rates were
found to be insignificant. At that point climate also
ecomes unimportant. Now firms seem to seek states that have
low taxes and high expenditure rates. The researchers feel
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this is a kind o-f bargain hunting effort by the firms.
CRef. 273
Welfare economic growth in states was examined in a study
by Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979). Their dependent variables
included per capita income growth as well as total income and
employment growth. They were particularly interested in the
impact of state taxes on economic growth. Their independent
variables included a marginal tax rate, state personal income
tax revenues versus a national average, state business tax
revenues versus a national average, adjusted transfer
payments, regional income change exclusive of the state, and
non—agriculture versus agriculture income. In the analysis
of per capita income growth transfer payments were found to
have a significant negative impact. Business taxes and the
regional income variable had positive significant impacts.
The researchers argued that the unexpected result for
business taxes was due to businesses getting something in
return for the taxes they paid. The total income growth
model results were similar, showing a significant negative
impact for state transfer expenditures. Business taxes and
regional income again had positive significant impacts. The
volume growth version did find a significant negative effect
for personal income taxes. CRef. 28D
Canto and Webb (1987) also examined per capita income
growth. They used three categories of explanatory variables;
state expenditures, state taxes, and per capita income of the
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United States. The relative tax burden was -found to have a
signi-ficant negative impact on growth. However, how those
taxes were used (either -for government purchases or transfer
payments) had an insignificant impact on state growth. They
also found a significant positive impact of national growth
on the state. [Ref. 29]
Business climate is a common explanatory category.
Almost all of the models reviewed tested some version of
business climate in their analysis. Two studies were
frequently cited as sources for measures of state business
climate and were either used as measures of the climate or as
a basis for choosing business climate variables.
One of those studies was prepared by Alexander Grant and
Company for the Conference of State Manufacturers Association
(COSMA) . This study weighted eighteen criteria to provide a












Energy cost per million BTU '
s
Average manufacturing wage
Days lost due to work stoppages
State taxes per capita
Net worth of state unemployment
Percentage change in energy cost
Vocational education spending per capita
Percentage change in state taxes per capita
Private pollution abatement expenditures compared
to value of shipments
Unemployment compensation benefits per worker
Manufacturer's pollution abatement expenditures
per capita
Percentage change in per capita state debt
Workers compensation insurance rate per :fl00
State spending versus state income growth
Maximum benefit paid workers disability
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17. Amount of state debt per capita
18. State spending per capita
Examined -for the 10 year period from 1969 to 1978,
percentage changes in these criteria were used to provide a
state ranking. The study noted a general correlation between
manufacturing employment growth and the relative business
climate ranking. CRe-f. 30D
Another study commonly referred to was conducted by the
Fantus Company for the Illinois Manufacturers Association.
This study used very similar variables as the COSMA study but
looked at absolute levels rather than percentage changes.
CRef. 17:p. 1141 There is a fairly good correlation between
the results of these two studies.
D. POOLED TIME SERIES AND CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS
Two studies are separated from the rest because the
regression method used to examine state growth was the same
as the one used in this thesis. Most of the other models
discussed in this chapter used a cross-sectional regression
model to determine which explanatory variables had the most
influence on state growth. The dependent variables serving
as a proxy for growth were usually a measure of change in
some welfare or volume statistic for each of the states over
a period of time. In the pooled time series and cross-
sectional models of state growth used by Helms and Finch
there is a dependent variable equation for all years and for
all states in the study.
48
Helms (1985) used data from the period 1965 to 1979 for
the 48 contiguous states. His proxy -for state growth was
state personal income. His explanatory variables were
measures of taxes and other state revenue, public
expenditures, and demographic and labor force
character i sti cs.
Helms used a budget constraint equation to force his
regression coefficients to be directly related to the
dependent variable. This budget constraint equation uses
federal transfer payments to equate state spending with state
taxes. The total of state expenditures are set equal to
total tax collection plus deficit spending plus federal
transfers. The federal transfer amount is a plug to force
equality of state expenditures versus state revenues.
Additionally, Helms uses the lagged value of the dependent
variable as an explanatory variable. This accounts for the
short run contribution of immobile factors of production.
The model also included state and year dummy variables.
The state (or case) dummy variables in Helms' model
represent state specific characteristics that do not change
over time, such as region, climate, location, and quantity
and quality of land. Note that in previous cross-sectional
models specific explanatory variables were used to take into
account these characteristics. The time dummy variables
account for nation-wide economic factors affecting all states
in a given year.
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Helms' -found significant impacts for all variables in his
budget constraint equations. State taxation and deficit
spending had a negative impact on groMth. The state
expenditure variables all had positive impacts. Federal
transfers, however, had a negative influence. Helms feels
this is due to the requirements attached to transfer funds by
the federal government, such as matching funds or required
earmarked spending. The only other significant explanatory
variable Mas population density, which had with a negative
influence on state growth. CRef 313
A master's thesis completed by Finch (1987) contained a
model of state growth that included defense expenditures as
an explanatory variable. Specifically, defense procurement
contracts were used as a measure of defense spending in a
state. The model was a pooled cross-sectional time series
using data from 1976 to 1981. The proxy for state growth was
state personal income. Besides defense spending, explanatory
variables included other Federal expenditures, state
expenditures and taxes, measures of the state business
climate, and state and time dummy variables.
The results of this study were similar to those of Helms.
Federal expenditures for education and highways were
significant and had a negative impact on state growth. State
expenditures were significant with a positive impact on
growth. State taxes and other measures of state business
climate were found to be insignificant. However, contrary to
5B
Helms' results, population density had a highly signi-ficant
positive impact on state growth. Perhaps most important,
de-fense expenditures were found to have a significant
positive impact on state economic growth as measured by
personal income. This was in contrast to the negative impact
of federal spending for education and highways. CRef. 4D
E. OTHER DEFENSE STUDIES
There have been other studies attempting to determine the
impact of defense expenditures on state growth. In one such
study Meneqakis (1970) used discriminate analysis to see if
states that had high levels of defense spending could be
singled out, using different economic and demographic
variables, from states that did not have high levels of
expenditures. The study analyzed economic and demographic
data from 1950 to 1960. At the state level this study found
no significant differences between states with high defense
spending and those with low defense spending. On the county
level the study found the level of military activity had a
direct affect on the economies of counties. CRef. 32D
Bolton (1966) conducted an in-depth study of defense
spending and regional economic growth using an input-output
model. The study used defense spending as a percentage of
state exogenous income and analyzed the period of 1947 to
1962 to determine the impact this spending had on state
growth. Bolton concluded the impact of defense spending
depended on two factors. The first was the weight of defense
income relative to all income received from outside the
state. The second was the rate o-f defense spending growth.
Specifically, Bolton felt that the Middle Atlantic and East
North Central states would have had higher growth with higher
defense spending because excess production capacity existed
during the period studied. Both the Mountain and Pacific
states showed higher levels of growth relative to the rest of
the Nation due to heavy increases in defense spending as
measured by total economic activity and population growth.
CRef. 331
In another study of defense spending impact on states
Weinstein (1985) concentrated on migration patterns of
military members. From 1965 to 1970 military personnel
accounted for 14.2 percent of all interregional migration.
These relocation decisions by the Department of Defense
resulted in a loss of over 20(3,0136) people from the Northeast
and North Central states with a corresponding increase in
Southern and Western states. Meinstein's studies indicated
the impact of these moves was compounded by decisions of
military members to stay in the region where they are
stationed when leaving the armed forces. Also, military
retirees tended to locate close to military bases.
Presumably this is done to take advantage of exchange and
medical privileges. California, Texas, Virginia and Florida
(the states with the largest number of military
installations) have all shown large growth in the number of
military retirees migrating into the state.
CRe-f. 17:pp. 19-27]
Based on the above literature on state growth and de-fense
impacts the next chapter develops the model and identifies
the variables used in this thesis. In addition the





Multiple regression analysis can be used to explore the
relationship between a set of independent variables and a
dependent variable. By estimating the independent variable
coefficients an explanatory model can be used to show how
changes in the dependent variable can be explained by changes
in the independent variables. This relationship can then be
used to estimate the effect changing an independent variable
has on the dependent variable. In this thesis a statistical
model was developed using a proxy for state economic growth
as the dependent variable and including defense expenditures
among the independent variables. This chapter develops that
statistical model.
Typically, econometric models using multiple regression
techniques base the model on a sample of cross-sectional
data. As mentioned in the previous chapter all of the growth
models discussed, except the models by Helms and Finch, used
cross-sectional data. This means a model using cross-
sectional data from the forty—eight contiguous states uses
forty-eight observations to estimate the coefficients.
However, this thesis pools cross-sectional and time series
data covering a ten year period, and thus has 480
observations. This much larger sample size allows a more
accurate assessment of the relationships between the
independent and dependent variables.
B. VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
This section discusses the dependent and independent
variables used in the model. As discussed previously,
personal income was used as the dependent variable in the
regression equation. The other variables Are included in the
equation in an attempt to explain the variation in personal
income. De-fense spending will be among the explanatory
variables. It is the impact of this spending that
constitutes the focal point of this thesis. By estimating
the regression coefficients for components of defense
spending their impact on state growth can be inferred.
But the model must reflect other explanatory variables as
well. State spending and taxation are expected to play a
role in differences in state growth rates. These aire often
considered part of the states' business climate—its ability
to attract and hold firms. Other business climate variables
are also reflected in the model.
Additionally, a pooled cross-sectional and time series
model should include dummy variables. One set of dummy
variables will reflect state specific characteristics. These
will include such things as climate, location, and state
laws. The other set of dummy variables will reflect time
dependent characteristics. Perhaps the most important of
these to this model is national economic growth. The use of
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these dummy variables is to adjust -for important information
omitted -from the model.
The -following sub-sections list the variables used in the





This variable served as a proxy for economic growth.
In the "volume growth" model total personal income is the
dependent variable. In the "welfare model" per capita income
is used. The basic income data is composed of wages plus
other labor and proprietors' income. Personal contributions
for social insurance are deducted from that total. Dividends,
interest, rent and transfer payments are then added to give
total personal income for a state in a given year. The
source of these data was the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, "State Personal Income," Survey
of Current Business , table 3, various volumes.
2. Defense Expenditures
Defense outlays are divided into six independent
variables. The first two are military and civilian payrolls.
These are gross earnings by military and civilian employees
of the Department of Defense. The spending was reported by
disbursement location and includes allowances such as basic
allowance for subsistence for military employees. As
discussed in Chapter II, the impacts of these two types of
payrolls are expected to be different from each other, and
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-from other types of military outlays, and -for that reason they
are separated.
The other -four components of defense spending Are
Department of Defense contracts for procurement, research and
development, services, and construction. Procurement
contracts Are for the purchase of all goods ranging from
weapons systems to office supplies. Research and Development
funds include payments to contractors for specific weapons
systems, and general scientific research grants to colleges
and universities. Service contracts ekre for various
contracted labor activities, such as running of a defense
facility, building repair contracts, janitorial work, and
equipment maintenance. Construction contracts Are for new
facilities built for the Department of Defense.
Due to the different nature of each type of contract
the impacts on the state Are expected to be very diverse.
For instance, procurement contracts Are highly capital-
intensive while service contracts Are mostly labor-intensive.
Construction contracts, unlike the others, will impact a very
specific sector of the economy in each state. Because of
these differing effects the contracts Are separated to
provide a more in depth view of how defense spending impacts
state growth. The data used is for contracts greater than
i^l0,i230 up until 1983, after which the Department of Defense
changed to keeping totals only on contracts exceeding
^25,000. Construction and service contracts Are for work
performed in a given state. Procurement and research and
development contracts are by factory location that performed
the largest dollar amount on a contract or by contractor home
office. All dollars spent on contracts are treated as
occurring in the state assigned in the year awarded, and sub-
contract effects are ignored.
There was a problem in compiling the data for defense
expenditures. During 1976 to 1980 the Community Services
Administration, Geographical Distribution of Federal Funds in
Summary , compiled these data for the Executive Office of the
President. However this publication was discontinued in
1980. The Directorate for Information Operations and Reports
(DIOR) , Department of Defense Atlas/State Data Abstract for
the United States started publishing the same statistics for
defense spending in 1982. These two sources were used, but,
unfortunately, this left data unavailable for 1981.
For 1981 payroll data were taken from the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States . Research and Development
contract data were available from DIOR, DQD Prime Contract
Awards by Region and State . This same publication did
provide a total figure for procurement, services and
construction contracts for each state in 1981, but no
breakdown by type was provided. In conversations with DIOR
it was discovered that the data are available on an unloaded
computer tape, but they do not run custom reports. As far as
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DIOR IS concerned, since a data sort by the three type of
contracts has never been done for 1981, the data is
unavailable CRe-f. 343.
The missing 1981 data necessitated applying a
weighted average proxy -for the 1981 defense expenditures.
Based on the 1980 and 1982 expenditures, a percentage was
applied -for each o-f the three contract categories to the
total expenditure -for 1981. When the regression was actually
done both the model with the calculated separate contract
values and a model with a combined contracts variable were
run. The results indicated that using separate contracts
with proxy values -for 1981 data was acceptable.
3. State Expenditures and Taxation
The di -f -f erences in state fiscal policies should also
have an impact on the relative rate of state growth.
Normally, state expenditures and taxation policies Are
considered part o-f a state's business climate. This is
expected to play an important role in growth due to firms
considering state business climate in locating or expanding
plants or services. Four variables Are used in the model to
re-flect state fiscal policy.
The first two variables Ar& measures of state
expenditures. One consists of the sum of state spending for
nealth, hospitals, education, and highways. These Are
considered outlays on "infrastructure" and might be thought
of bv firms or employees as desirable expenditures. These
expenditures are expected to make the state a more attractive
place to live, or reduce the cost of producing in the state.
The other variable is state welfare spending, generally
viewed as an undesirable expenditures by firms. Welfare
payments are often considered as a detriment or burden on a
state. High welfare payments might be expected to adversely
affect firm location decisions. Both of these expenditure
variables include federal transfers for these purposes within
a given state.
The other two fiscal variables represent state
taxation for individuals and corporations. Due to the forty-
eight different tax structures, direct comparison of tax
variables is practically impossible. Instead, the variables
used are proxies for taxation; a nominal tax rate is
calculated for each state. The proxy variable for personal
income taxes is total state revenue from personal income
taxes divided by state personal income. The corporate tax
rate proxy equals total state revenue from corporate income
taxes divided by private, non—agricul tural business income.
The data for state spending and revenues came from
the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, State
Government Finances . various volumes. The personal income
and corporate income statistics were taken from the
previously cited Survey of Current Business .
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4. Other Business Climate Measures
To gain a more complete picture o-f the business
climate of the state three other variables are included in
the growth model. The first o-f these is population density.
This is the total state population divided by land area.
This variable serves as a measure of the market potential in
a state for goods and services.
The cost of labor in a state is expected to play a
part in state growth. To account for this, the average
manufacturing wage rate is included as an explanatory
variable. This is expected to be indicative of the
prevailing overall wage rates in a state in a given year.
Finally, a lot of attention has been focused on the
decline of the manufacturing belt. The dependency of a state
on manufacturing is expected to have both a positive and
negative effect. On the one hand, agglomeration effects
would be expected to help state growth, the idea that
industry attracts industry. On the other, manufacturing in
the United States has been declining during the last decade,
and those states that are heavily dependent on manufacturing
have not grown as rapidly as the rest of the nation. To
capture the effect of manufacturing agglomeration, a proxy
variable was used that equalled manufacturing employment
divided by population.
Data for population, land area, and average
manufacturing wage were taken from the U.S. Department of
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Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract o^^ the
United States , various years. Data for manufacturing
employment was from U.S. Department o-f Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics .
5. Omitted Variables
Two specific variables felt to be important in
modeling state growth were omitted from the model. One is a
measure of energy costs and the other is a measure of state
unionization. Both Are believed to be important to a state's
growth in a way not reflected by other explanatory variables.
However, consistently collected data for every state and each
year of the ten year period could not be found. This
omission is expected to increase the significance of the
state dummy variables in the regression equation. The state
dummies may in part reflect regional differences in
electricity costs and unionization, while the time dummy will
reflect overall national trends.
6. Model Variations
In the volume growth model total dollars are used for
both the dependent variable and defense and state expenditure
variables. The welfare growth model uses per capita data for
the above variables. The rest of the variables are the same
in both models.
All data that are in dollars Are deflated. Department
of Defense deflators were used for all defense expenditure
variables. Personal and corporate income, as well as
manu-f acturing wage variables, used GNP de-flators. State
government deflators were used -for state revenue and
expenditure variables. The deflators were taken from the
previously cited Survey of Current Business .
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the
fourteen variables used in the volume growth model. Note
that all dollar figures in this model are in billions of
dollars, except average manufacturing wage. Table 6 presents




Correlation is used to measure the strength of
association between variables. The strength of a
relationship between two variables is represented by r, the
coefficient of correlation. The coefficient of correlation
can range between -1 and +1. If there is a perfect one for
one relationship between variables, r will equal (-H). When
the variables are not related r will equal zero. A perfect
negative correlation will result in an r of (—1).
The correlation matrix for the volume growth model is
shown in Table 7. The high values of the coefficients of
correlation between independent variables indicate
mul ti col 1 i near ity may occur in the regression model.
Mul 1 1 col 1 i neari ty means there is a linear relationship
between two or more of the independent variables and that
changes in one variable a.re associated with changes in other
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TABLE 5
DESCRIPTION OF 'v'ARIABLES: VOLUME GROWTH MODEL
VARIABLE MEAN STD DEV MINIMUl!! MAXIMUM
PERSONAL 25.1 28.3 1.97 182
INCOME
MILITARY .216 .329 .00 2.12
PAY *
CIVILIAN .194 .270 .00 1.59
PAY
PROCUREMENT .546 .916 .00 7.45
CONTRACTS *
R 3< D .124 .313 .00 2.54
CONTRACTS *
SERVICE .147 .250 .00 1.60
CONTRACTS *
CONSTRUCTION .018 .029 .00 .20
CONTRACTS *
STATE HEALTH 1.39 1.39 .16 8.93
EDUC. Zc HIGH.
STATE .493 .748 .02 4.56
WELFARE *
MANUFACTURING .080 .032 .01 .14
EMPLOYMENT
PERSONAL .016 .011 .00 .04
INCOME TAX
CORPORATE .008 .004 .00 .02
INCOME TAX
POPULATION .159 .224 .00 1.01
DENSITY
MANUFACTURING 3.96 .569 2.89 5.45
_WAGE_*»*
- BILLIONS OF 1972 DOLLARS
- POPULATION (X 1000) PER SQUARE MILE* - 1972 DOLLARS PER HOUR
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TABLE 6




MEAN STD DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
5060 723.6 3433 7796
PER CAPITA
MILITARY PAY *
51.0 41.4 .97 J45.
PER CAPITA
CIVILIAN PAY
42. 1 >a. 4.94 206.6
PER CAPITA
PROCUREMENT CONT. *
97.9 105.9 2. 52 752.4
PER CAPITA
R S» D CONT.






4.5 5.3 .00 44.6
PER CAPITA STATE









.080 .01 . 14
PERSONAL
INCOME TAX
.016 .011 00 .04
CORPORATE
INCOME TAX
008 004 .00 02
POPULATION
DENSITY **
. 159 .224 00 1.01
MANUFACTURING
WAGE *
3.96 .569 2.89 1.4!
* - 1972 DOLLARS PER PERSON
** - POPULATION (x 1000) PER SQUARE MILE
- 1972 DOLLARS PER HOUR
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explanatory variables, in addition to being associated with
changes in the dependent variable. A rule o-f thumb is that a
coe-f -f icient of correlation greater than .7 between two
independent variables is indicative of mul ticol 1 ineari ty
CRe-f. 35: p. 183. Correlation shows association o-f variables
but not causality. In this analysis state spending -for
health, education, and highways is highly correlated with
state spending on welfare. This is expected because as
growth occurs all public expenditures tend to increase
together. The same relationship would be expected between
military spending variables. This is not an unusual
occurrence in time series data where variables move together
over time. The result of mul ticol 1 ineari ty will be an
increase in the standard errors of the regression parameters.
CRef. 36: p. 68 3
Table 8 is the correlation matrix for the welfare growth
model. Correlation is not present in the independent
variables to the extent it is in the volume growth model.
There is a surprising significant negative correlation
between the dependent variable and per capita state
expenditures for health, education and highways. These
simple correlation coefficients can be misleading however,
since other factors are not held constant. This is the
purpose of the multivariate regression model.
Using the model and data just specified, ordinary least
square regression was used to calculate explanatory variable
66
TABLE 7
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR VOLUME GROWTH MODEL























PERS MIL CIV PROC R&D SERV CONS
INC PAY PAY CONT CONT CONT CONT
1.000 .6531 .7067 . 839
1
.7388 .8245 .5888
** ** « ** *
.6531 1.000 .8655 . 688c> .7149 .7925 .8115
* ** ** *
.7067 .8655 1.000 .7002 .7396 .8240 .7684
* *« **
-X-
-8391 .6883 .7002 1.000 .8532 .8579 .6441
* ** « *
.7383 .7149 .7396 .8532 1.000 .8255 .7042
* * «* * *
.8245 .7925 .8240 .8579 .8255 1.000 .7004
* * ** ** * **
.5888 .8115 .7684 .6441 .7042 .7004 1.000
* ** ** * **
.9818 .6879 .7241 .8145 .7289 .8196 .6256
« ** *
.9359 .5368 .6315 .7990 .7673 .8019 .5220
** * *
. 1737 -.015 .0432 . 1368 .0247 .0153 -.031# *




2325 .0104 .0761 .1926 .2161 .1830 .0181
POPULATION
DENSITY
2385 -.040 .0965 .2215 .1667 .1885 -.046
MANUFACTURING
WAGE
2408 -.105 .0261 .1345 .1380 .0305 -.029
* - SIGNIFICANCE LESS THEN OR EQUAL TO .01






STATE STATE MFGT INC COR POP MFGT
HE&H WELF EMPL TAX TAX DEN WAGE
.9818 .9359 . 1737 . 1104 .2325 . ^^85 .2408
** ** ** * ** * **
MILITARY
PAY
6879 .5368 -.011 -.045 0104 -.040 -.105
CIVILIAN
PAY
.7241 .6315 .0432 0229 .0761 .0965 .0261
PROCUREMENT . 8 1 45
CONTRACTS **
7990 . 1368 0559 .1926 .2215 .1345
R S< D
CONTRACTS
7289 .7673 .0247 .0954 .2161 .1667 .1380
SERVICE
CONTRACTS
.8196 .8019 0153 1294 . 1830 1885 .0305
CONSTRUCT I ON . 6256
CONTRACTS *
5220 -.031 -.076 .0181 -.046 -.029
STATE HEALTH
EDUC. i< HIGH.
















2255 .3744 .4161 .4820 1.000 .3137 -.016
** ** ** *
POPULATION
DENSITY
1502 .2377 .4649 .1441 .3137 1.000 -.046
* * * »«
MANUFACTURING
WAGE
2417 2519 -.102 .1681 -.016 -.046 1.000
* - SIGNIFICANCE LESS THEN OR EQUAL TO .01
- SIGNIFICANCE LESS THEN OR EQUAL TO .001
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TABLE 8
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR WELFARE GROWTH MODEL










i +++++ ++ p E R C A P I T A +++++-t-++
;
PERS MIL CIV PROC R&D SERV CONS
INC PAY PAY CONT CONT CONT CONT
kersonal 1.000 -.087 -.048 . •^/'2*0 .4169 .3149 -.073
INCOME * **
MILITARY -.087 1.000 .5229 -. 112 .0677 .4759 .4392
PAY * * * **
CIVILIAN -.048 .5229 1.000 .0552 .3039 .5432 .3621
PAY ** ** ** **
PROCUREMENT . 3936 -. 112 .0552 1.000 .4112 .3941 -.042
CONTRACTS * ** *«
R S. D .4169 .0677 .3039 .4112 1.000 .4173 . 1350
CONTRACTS * * * *
SERVICE .3149 .4759 .5432 .3941 .4173 1.000 .2502
CONTRACTS « * **
CONSTRUCTION -.073 .4392 .3621 -.042 . 1350 .2502 1.000
CONTRACTS « * **
STATE HEALTH -.130 .2558 . 0630 -.299 -.072 -.036 .2054
EDUC. ?< HIGH. « ** «* **
STATE .4067 -.397 -.162 .2386 .2981 .0838 -.212
WELFARE * ** « * ** *
MANUFACTURING .0625 — . 322 -.067 .3189 .0191 -.060 -.260
EMPLOYMENT * * **
PERSONAL .0786 -.208 -.053 -.054 .0180 .0293 -.257
INCOME TAX «* *
CORPORATE .0866 -.213 -.127 .1316 .0268 .0262 -.241
INCOME TAX ** * *
POPULATION .4663 - . 236 . 1 29 .3377 .2810 .2231 -. 179
DENSITY ** * * * *
MANUFACTURING .4222 - . 366 - . 239 -.028 . 1326 -. 168 -. 175
WAGE * * ** *
- SIGNIFICANCE LESS THEN OR EQUAL TO .01













1 PER CAPITA 1
STATE STATE MFGT INC COR POP MFGT
HE&H WELF EMPL TAX TAX DEN WAGE
PERSONAL -.130 .4067 .0625 .0786 .0866 .4663 . 4222
INCOME * * **
MILITARY .2558 - . 397 - . 322 -.208 -. 213 -.236 -.366
PAY « ** ** ** *
CIVILIAN .0630 -. 162 -.067 — . 053 -. 127 .0129 -.239
PAY **
PROCUREMENT -.299 . ^^6 .3189 -.054 .1316 . 3377 -.028
CONTRACTS M-K- * *
R&D -.072 .2981 .0191 .0180 .0268 .2810 . 1326
CONTRACTS ** *
SERVICE -.036 .0838 -.060 . 0293 .0262 .2231 -.168
CONTRACTS ** **
CONSTRUCTION .2054 -.212 -.260 -.257 -.241 -. 179 -. 175
CONTRACTS ** ** ** »« *« ** *
STATE HEALTH 1.000 -. 177 -.474 .0745 -. 164 -.347 . 1488
EDUC. & HIGH. ** ** **
STATE -.177 1.000 .3906 .4492 . 5354 .5162 .2122
WELFARE * «« ** ** * «*
MANUFACTURING -.474 .3906 1.000 .3055 .4161 .4649 -. 102
EMPLOYMENT ** ** *« * *
PERSONAL .0745 .4492 .3055 1.000 .4820 .1441 .1681
INCOME TAX * * ** -K-N-
CORPORATE -.164 .5354 .4161 .4820 1.000 • •-> 1 0» / -.016
INCOME TAX ** * *« «« *
POPULATION -.347 .5162 .4649 .1441 .3137 1.000 -.046
DENSITY ** ** ** * *»
MANUFACTURING . 148B o ^ '^2 -. 102 .1681 -.016 -.046 1.000
WAGE *» »«
- SIGNIFICANCE LESS THEN OR EQUAL TO .01
- SIGNIFICANCE LESS THEN OR EQUAL TO .001
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coe-fficients. The results of the regression of both the
volume and welfare growth models are presented in the next
chapter.
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V. ANALYSIS OF REGRESSION RESULTS
The explanatory variable coe-f -f icients for the model were
estimated using ordinary least square regression on the SPSSX
In-formation Analysis System. The computer output o-f the
regression results Are presented in Appendix A. The
following discussion of results is broken into two sections.
The first section discusses the volume variant of the growth
model, and the second discusses the welfare variant.
A. VOLUME GROWTH MODEL
Two regressions were estimated initially, one containing
the state and year dummy variables, and one without the dummy
variables. Ideally the model without the dummy variables is
preferred. The use of the dummies is an attempt to adjust
for information omitted from the original model. For the
state dummies this information might include climate,
geography, unionization, and energy price differences
relative to other states. The year dummies might represent
cyclical trends that impact on all of the states. These
dummy variables may explain a significant portion of the
error variance. However, since the dummies represent
important unknown variables no additional knowledge of what
causes state economic growth is gained from their inclusion.
Inclusion of the dummy variables also result in a reduction
in degrees of freedom from 466 to 410. This means the
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statistical power o-f the growth model will not be as great as
if the dummies were not included.
A statistical test was used to determine whether the
dummy variables should be included in the model. The test
compares the residual sum o-f squares from the two different
models. The model without dummy variables is more
restrictive by farcing the intercepts to be equal for all
observations independent of state or year. This causes a
higher residual sum of squares for that model. If there is a
statistically significant decrease in the residual sum of
squares when dummy variables are added to the equation, then
results based on the dummy variable model are more
appropr i ate.
An F—statistic of 42.5 with 56 degrees of freedom for the
numerator and 410 degrees of freedom for the denominator was
calculated from the results of the two regression runs. The
numerator of the statistic was calculated by dividing the
difference in the residual sum of squares between the models
by the additional degrees of freedom of the model without
dummy variables. The denominator of the F—statistic is the
residual sum of squares from the model including dummy
variables divided by the degrees of freedom of that model.
The null hypothesis is that the model without the dummy
variables is correct. The critical value for a significance
level of .005 is 1.87. Based on the calculated F-statistic
the null hypothesis is strongly rejected and the model with
the dummy variables should be used. CRe-f. 36:p. 2053 This
means that there is significant variation in the dependent
variable that is explained by the dummy variables.
Because of the outcome of the above test the results
presented in this section are based on the regression
coefficients calculated when the dummy variables Mere
included in the growth model. The summary of the
coefficients for the volume growth variables is presented in
Table 9. The t-ratios shown test the null hypothesis that
the regression coefficient for an explanatory variable is
zero or, in other words, that the variable has no impact on
total personal income. Significance is the probability that
the null hypothesis is true. For example, manufacturing wage
has a 90 percent chance of having no impact on personal
income. This result indicates this explanatory variable is
unimportant in growth of a state.
Defense contracts, on the other hand, are all significant
to a state's growth measured by total personal income. The
coefficients of the defense contract variables do give a
relative idea of the impact that each type of contract has on
state growth. The higher t-ratios mean an increase in
confidence that the impact indicated by the coefficient
occurred. The elasticity column in Table 9 allows a
comparison of the impact of the different explanatory
variables. Elasticities, since they are unit free, show how





(Dependent Variable is Total Fersonal Income)
VARIABLE QQiEEiQIENT Iz^AIIQ SIGNIFICANCE ELASIICIIY
MILITARY -1.442 -.772 .44 -.012
PAY
CIVILIAN -18.49 -4.05 .00 -.143
PAY
PROCUREMENT 4.694 11.2 .00 .102
CONTRACTS
R 2< D 5.265 3.90 .00 .026
CONTRACTS
SERVICE 8.939 5.21 .00 .052
CONTRACTS
CONSTRUCTION 19.54 3.25 .00 -014
CONTRACTS
STATE HEALTH 6.041 9.24 .00 .335
EDUC. ?< HIGH.
STATE 4.319 3.43 .00 .085
WELFARE
MANUFACTURING -32.28 -1.50 -13 -.103
EMPLOYMENT
PERSONAL -84.88 -1.81 .07 -.054
INCOME TAX
CORPORATE -113.6 -1.91 .06 -.036
INCOME TAX
POPULATION 220.7 8.04 .00 1.40
DENSITY
MANUFACTURING -.1175 -.127 .90 -.162
WAGE
(Complete regression results are in appendix A)
independent variable. The value shown is the percentage
change expected in personal income given a one percent change
in the explanatory variable. Personal income is relatively
inelastic with respect to all de-fense spending variables,
with procurement contracts having the largest impact.
The results of the civilian payroll explanatory variable
were unexpected. Not only does the model indicate that
civilian pay has a negative e-f-fect on personal income growth,
but the coe-f -f ici ent and t—ratio are relatively high. This
means that as the Department o-f De-fense increased civilian
pay (either through raises or increased employment) states
grew slower then i -f pay had not been increased. The reason
for this result is unclear. Possibly defense hiring of
civilians pulled employees away from higher paying Jobs in a
state. This would assume that civilians were drawn from a
productive employment pool and not from among people who
would otherwise be unemployed or working at menial tasks.
Given the general skills required for defense civilian
employees this is not an unreasonable assumption. In the
Department of Defense unskilled or low skilled jobs tend to
be performed by military members.
The military payroll result was not unexpected. While
the coefficient is negative, it is relatively insignificant.
As discussed in Chapter II military members tend to buy from
military commissaries and exchanges. Often food and lodging
is provided on base. Most members do not even pay state
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income taxes in the state where they are located. But these
military members do consume state public goods. They use
public schools and state highways. All the services
available to a -full time resident o-f the state Are usually
available to military members stationed in the state. All o-f
this could be expected to cause military payrolls to have an
insignificant impact on state economic growth.
State expenditures and taxation variables had the
expected results. Both state spending -for health, highways
and education and expenditures -for wel-fare have a positive
and signi-ficant ef-fect on state growth. The wel-fare result
is in part due to using personal income as the proxy -for
state economic growth. These expenditures result in people
who otherwise may have little or no income having an income
and contributing to state growth. The adverse side o-f these
trans-fer payments would be the money removed from the economy
to pay for them. This is reflected in the negative (and
significant at the 10 percent level) tax proxy coefficients.
Determination of whether a state grew faster or slower due to
taxation and how the collected revenues are spent, cannot be
made with this model. The tax variables are proxies and
their coefficients cannot be directly related to the
expenditure variables, due to the different dimensions
involved (expenditures a.re in dollars while tax proxies Are
di mensi onl ess) . Comparison of the elasticities indicate that
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the gains in personal income due to increased spending have
o-f-fset the losses due to increased taxation.
Manufacturing over the last decade has declined in the
United States. Those states in the traditional manufacturing
belt have had slower economic growth due to the heavy
dependence o-f the state economies on manufacturing. This
result is reflected in the manufacturing employment
explanatory variable. Mhile not highly significant (only at
the 13 percent level), the negative coefficient indicates
that the more dependent a state was on manufacturing the
slower the growth in total personal income. The average
manufacturing wage, while having a negative coefficient, was
insignificant.
Population density was a highly significant variable.
Its coefficient, again due to different dimensions, is not
directly comparable to the other explanatory variables, but
the t-ratio indicates that states with a high papulation
density grew faster. In fact, this is the only explanatory
variable that had an elasticity greater than one—meaning
personal income is very responsive to a change in population
density. Population density is often referred to as a proxy
-for markets. The greater the density the greater the demand
for goods and the supply of labor. Both factors would fuel
state economic growth.
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B. WELFARE GROWTH MODEL
The statistical test conducted -for the previous model was
also calculated for the welfare model to determine i -f the
dummy variables should be used. The calculated F—statistic
was 70.6 with 56 degrees o-f -freedom in the numerator and 410
degrees o-f -freedom in the denominator. Again there is highly
signi-ficant statistical evidence that the model should
include the dummy variables. The complete computer results,
both with and without state and year dummy variables, appear
in Appendix A. The regression results -for the model with
dummy variables are presented in Table 10, along with the
el asti ci ti es.
De-fense spending -for all categories had a positive e-ffect
on per capita income growth over the last decade. But only
spending for procurement contracts and research and
development contracts were highly significant. So the more
dollars spent per state resident on these two types of
defense contracts the more statistically significant the
increase in state welfare as measured by per capita income.
This could be partly due to the high technology involved in
the majority of procurement contracts and in all research and
development contracts. People employed for this work would
tend to be relatively highly paid individuals. This could
also be expected to be true of suppliers to the initial
contractors. Per capita income was also relatively inelastic





(Dependent Variable is Per Capita Income)
!!^A5'IABLE QQiFFICIENT IzRAJIQ SIGNIFICANCE ELASTICITY
PER CAPITA 1.220 1.36 .17 .012
MILITARY PAY
PER CAPITA 2.220 1.52 .13 .018
CIVILIAN PAY
PER CAPITA .7808 3.62 .00 .015
PROCUREMENT CONT.
PER CAPITA 2.781 3.30 .00 .010
R ii D CONT.
PER CAPITA .8847 1.48 .14 .005
SERVICE CONT.
PER CAPITA 2.740 1.52 .13 .002
CONSTRUCT. CONT.
PER CAP. STATE -.6616 -1.71 .09 -.041
HLTH ED. & HGH.
PER CAPITA 1.787 1.77 .08 .031
STATE WELFARE
MANUFACTURING 9313 4.66 .00 .147
EMPLOYMENT
PERSONAL -8284 -1.94 .05 -.026
INCOME TAX
CORPORATE -11720 -2.20 .03 -.019
INCOME TAX
POPULATION 21200 9.32 .00 .666
DENSITY
MANUFACTURING 286.0 3.38 .00 .224
WAGE
(Complete regression results are in appendix A)
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The per capita state spending results do contain a bit of
a surprise. The results indicate (at a 9 percent
significance level) that state spending -for health,
education, and highways has a negative impact on the
individual welfare of the state's population. The
correlation coefficient between state spending for health,
highway, and education and per capita income is significantly
negative. The reason for this is unknown.
The positive influence of state welfare spending could be
expected- Typically, welfare expenditures try to maintain an
income level for poorer members of the state at or above a
poverty level. This would act to increase the state's
overall per capita income level.
Both tax proxies have significant negative effects on
state per capita income growth. These variables represent a
reduction in disposable income for individuals, either
through less pay or decreased dividends. This would be
expected to slow growth. Again, since these are proxy rates,
and welfare is an expenditure variable, a comparison of these
coefficients does not allow an evaluation to be made on a
"spreading the wealth" policy. The elasticities of the
variables do indicate that per capita income has increased
when welfare payments and taxes have both increased.
Manufacturing employment had a positive significant effect
on per capita income. Even while manufacturing regions have
not grown as fast as the nation, per capita income growth has
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kept pace. A passible reason -for this is that high union
concentrations in these areas has maintained Mages despite
the overall economic decline. The positive, significant
coe-f -f i ci ent -for average manufacturing wage rate supports this
idea. Additionally, as manufacturing has declined, large out
migrations of workers has occurred. States like Indiana and
Michigan have had a decline in total population during the
period studied. Since per capita income is a function of
both total personal income and population, these states have
not seen a large relative decline in per capita income. This
means workers leaving the state, on the average, earn less
than those that remain. This could be the primary reason for
their decision to relocate.
Population density, again serving as a market proxy, had
a positive influence on per capita income growth. The
reasons for this are expected to be the same as the volume
growth model. More demand for goods and services and a higher
supply of labor would contribute to greater economic
activity. Additionally, those states with a low population
density, such as Montana and Wyoming, tend to have agrarian
based economies. The average person working in agriculture
tends to have a lower income than those employed elsewhere.
C. AUTOCORRELATION
One assumption in regression analysis is that
observations are drawn independently. Ideally an observation
one year will not be related to the next year's observation.
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This IS not a realistic expectation for the data in the
growth models. Expenditures in 1976 tend to be a good
predictor of expenditures in 1977 -for a given state. One
common measure o-f autocorrelation is the Durbi n-Watson
stati st i c
.
For both the volume growth and welfare growth models the
Durbin-Watson statistics indicate autocorrelation is present.
The year dummy variables partly help to correct this problem.
The volume growth model goes from a Durbin-Watson statistic
of .567 to 1.12 when the dummy variables are added. The
welfare growth model does not improve as much, going from
.513 to .957 with the dummy variables. However, even with
the improvement autocorrelation is still occurring.
Autocorrelation tends to cause distortion in the
estimates of the standard errors of the regression
coefficients. This in turn causes a decreased confidence in
the significance of the explanatory variable coefficient.
CRef. 35: p. 10] Other than being aware of the problem and





During the last decade Defense spending has mostly had a
positive influence on state economic growth. Results from
the linear regression models presented in the preceding
chapter showed that all types of defense contracts had a
significant positive influence on economic growth as measured
by growth in total personal income. Department of Defense
spending for civilian pay, however, did have a negative
influence on personal income, whereas military pay had an
insignificant (negative) impact. Only spending on two types
of contracts (procurement, and research and development) had
a significant positive impact on state welfare economic
growth, as measured by per capita income. The other types
of defense spending seemed to have a positive influence, but
not at a ten percent level of significance.
The results of this thesis are interesting from a policy
viewpoint. In the past, state policies have attempted to
influence Department of Defense decisions to increase defense
spending in their state, expecting this increased spending to
stimulate state growth, a viewpoint supported by this thesis.
But elected officials must now assess the impact cuts in
defense spending will have on their states.
The issue facing the Department of Defense, and the
entire Federal Government, is the renewed Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act (Gramm-Rudman) . Present
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-forecasts are that de-fense spending will have to take an
til. 5 billion cut in 1988 CRef. 373. This -figure is DQD s
fifty percent share of the cuts needed to achieve the federal
deficit target of i:l44 billion. To give an idea of how the
thesis results could be used, an analysis was conducted of
how the possible cuts in defense spending forced by this Act
would impact state economic growth.
Originally the cuts in DQD spending were to be spread
equally over all military accounts resulting in a 6.3 percent
reduction in each account. But President Reagan has
committed to exempting military personnel accounts from
taking any cuts. This will necessitate deeper cuts, if
spread equally about 10.5 percent, in other categories of
spending. Department of Defense comptroller, Robert Helm,
recently gave the most likely scenario for how cuts will be
made: operations and maintenance accounts 10 percent;
procurement 16 percent; research and development 11 percent;
and military construction 11.7 percent. CRef. 37]
The model for personal income growth was used to
calculate the impact of these three possible ways of making
defense cuts. To do this several assumptions were made.
First, the cuts would be spread proportional to the volume of
defense spending among the states. Second, since the model
could not be used to predict the affect of cuts for 1988,
because most explanatory variables Are unknown, the model was
used to show the impact these deficit reduction cuts would
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have had on 1985 personal income i -f made in that year. This
assumes the impacts Mould remain the same. Third, all
explanatory variables were assumed to remain constant, other
than those -for defense spending. The results o-f the spending
cuts on personal income are summarized in Appendix B.
Total personal income -for the United States Mas -found to
be reduced 0.7 percent Mith the across the board 6.3 percent
reduction in spending. HoMever , exempting military pay -from
cuts made the matter Morse. With the cuts evenly spread over
the remaining accounts personal income Mas reduced 1.1
percent, and Mith DQD ' s predicted uneven distribution of cuts
personal income Mas reduced 1.8 percent. Individually, some
states, such as Oregon, shoMed little change in personal
income no matter hoM the cuts Mere made. Other states,
hoMever , suf-fered severely Mhen the policy Mas changed from
all accounts being cut equally to the uneven distribution of
cuts exempting military pay. Connecticut Ment from a 2.6
percent reduction in personal income to a 6.3 percent
reduction. Missouri, similarly, Ment from 2.3 percent
reduction to 6.1 percent reduction in personal income. This
indicates these states should be very concerned Mith the
policy of exempting military pay from the Deficit Control Act
reductions.
A caveat to this analysis should be made. The thesis
results are for an average state based on historical data.
There is no ability to predict the future outcome based on
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the model results. This is compounded by signi-ficant
statistical problems in the model, such as mul 1 1 col 1 i neari ty
and autocorrelation. The suggested impact of the defense
cuts Are provided as a look at what the regression results
would indicate. Also, other effects, such as a decline in
interest rates that will probably occur with deficit
reduction Are not included here.
In summary, there is statistical evidence of positive
contribution to state growth of defense spending on
contracts. Elected federal officials should be aware of this
significant contribution and actively pursue policies that
will increase the viability of defense businesses in their
states. As defense spending cuts become more of a reality,
individual states must assess the impact on their future
economic growth.
Areas for possible future study include:
1. Study of methodology for reducing autocorrelation such
33 the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure or the Hildreth-Lu
procedure. Applying this to the thesis model would
increase the confidence in the regression coefficients.
Discussion of these two methods in particular can be
found in Reference 36.
2. Specific study of Area multiplier effects of defense
spending should be undertaken. This will be especially
crucial as defense cutbacks begin to take place. A
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study similar to the one previously cited for Wichita,
Kansas could provide such in-formation CRe-f. 23.
An interesting relationship was noticed between two
different studies cited in this thesis- Menegakis in
Reference 32 did a discriminate analysis to determine
if high military spending states could be identified by
social and economic parameters. His results were
inconclusive. However from comparison of his
mi scl assi f 1 ed states and the Net Defense Department
Spending per worker calculated by the Council on
Economic Priorities, shown in Table 3, there seems to
be some relationship between the parameters and this
method of determining relative defense spending. A





This Appendix contains the regression results -for the
thesis. First the models with personal income as the
dependent variable a.re presented- Versions with and
without state and year dummy variables Ar& included, along
with the results for a model where all Department o-f
Defense expenditures were combined into one explanatory
variable. Next, results for the models with per capita
income as the dependent variable Are presented. The
coefficients of the explanatory variables represent the
average values for all states examined. To determine
results for a particular state in a given year for a model
with dummy variables the appropriate state and year dummy
variable results must be included in the equation. The
base state and year is Wyoming in 1985 with no dummy




MILPAY = DQD Military Pay
CIVPAY = DQD Civilian Pay
PROCCON = DQD Procurement Contracts
RDCON = DDD Research & Development Contracts
SERVCON = DOD Service Contracts
CDNSCDN = DOD Construction Contracts
STWEL = State Expenditures for Welfare
STHEH = State Expenditures -for Health, Education and Highway'
INCTXPY = Personal Income Tax Proxy
CORTXPY = Corporate Income Tax Proxy
MANEMPAG = Manufacturing Employment
MANMAGE = Average Manufacturing Mage
POPDEN = Population Density
DQDTOTAL = Combined DOD Payrolls and Contracts
PCMILPAY = Per Capita DOD Military Pay
PCCIVPAY = Per Capita DOD Civilian Pay
PCPROCON = Per Capita DOD Procurement Contracts
PCRDCQN = Per Capita DOD Research & Development Contracts
PCSRVCON = Per Capita DOD Service Contracts
PCCSTCON = Per Capita DOD Construction Contracts
PCSTWEL = Per Capita State Expenditures for Welfare
PCSTHEH = Per Capita State Expenditures for Health,
Education and Highways
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EQUATION NUMBER 1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PERSONAL INCOME

















F = 1951.99373 SIGNIF F = .0000








MILPAY -1.443063 1,.866841 -.016757 -.773 .4400
CIVPAY -18.488124 4.. 562069 -. 176040 -4.053 .0001
PROCCON 4.693809 .418102 . 151684 1 1 . 226 .0000
RDCON 5.265133 1.. 350334 . 058234 3.899 .0001
SERVCON 8.938893 1,.716073 . 078850 5.209 .0000
CONSCON 19.539607 6.. 006884 .019991 3.253 .0012
STWEL 4.318624 1,, 259695 . 114010 3.428 .0007
STHEH 6.040854 . 653520 . 296570 9.244 .0000
INCTXPY -84.863304 46.. 799653 -.031752 -1.813 .0705
CORTXPY -113.642059 59..421107 -.015913 -1.912 .0565
MANEMPAG -32.290531 21,. 505770 -.036224 -1.501 . 1340
MANWAGE -. 117706 . 923793 -.002362 -. 127 .8987
POPDEN 220.807283 27,. 468449 1 . 746997 8.039 .0000




1976 -1.898515 . 470554 -.020117 -4.035 .0001
1977 -1.538605 .475794 -.016303 -3.234 .0013
1978 -.851035 . 486909 -.009018 -1.748 .0812
1979 -. 196657 . 492245 -.002084 -.400 .6897
1980 -.410167 .455120 -.004346 -.901 .3680
1981 -.835814 . 425344 -.008856 -1.965 .0501
1982 -1.307367 .377207 -.013853 -3.466 .0006
1983 -1.645644 . 388087 -.017437 -4.240 . 0000
1984 -.430767 .384406 -.004458 -1.095 .2743
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EQUATION NUMBER 1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PERSONAL INCOME
STATE DUMMY COEFFICIENTS
VARIABLE B SE B BETA T SIG T
AL -3.006133 2.937603 -.015165 -1.023 .3068
AZ 4.402475 1 . 443775 . 022209 3.049 .0024
AR -.359349 2.493304 -.001813 -. 144 .8855
CA 34.616749 9.459009 . 174628 4.474 .0000
CO 7.356050 1.644350 .037108 4.474 .0000
CT -131.479533 17.249580 -.663463 -7.622 .0000
DE -59.652816 8.875480 -.300925 -6.721 .0000
FL -5.567191 4.981542 -.028084 -1. 118 .2644
6A . 682080 3.572282 . 00344
1
. 191 .8487
ID 3.821357 1.707190 .019277 2.238 .0257
IL 3.515146 5.685810 .017733 .618 .5368
IN -13.283754 4.429493 -.067011 -2.999 .0029
lA -.011919 2.260107 - . 000060 -.005 .9958
KS 3.914502 1.855118 .019798 2. 116 .0350
KY -7.309680 2.842369 -.036875 -2.572 .0105
LA -10.906062 2.531580 -.055017 -4.308 .0000
ME -1.871658 2.439560 -.008442 -.767 .4434
MD -74.416805 1 1 . 733963 -.375404 -6.342 .0000
MA -143.999791 19.917042 -.726423 -7.230 .0000
MI -3.672849 4.807844 -.018528 -.764 .4453
MN 3.233221 2.802953 .016310 1. 154 .2494
MS -5.558745 2.475273 -.028042 -2.246 .0253
MO -3.013642 2.624402 -.015203 -1.148 .2515
MT 3.859459 1 . 565547 .019469 2.465 .0141
NE 3.961153 1 . 494643 .019982 2.650 .0084
NV 1.514173 .771639 . 007638 1.962 .0504
NH -47.007776 3.614488 -.070664 -3.875 .0001
NJ -182.662598 26.797236 -.921462 -6.816 .0000
NM 1.601853 1 . 272487 .008081 1.259 .2008
NY -32.596621 10.321478 -. 164437 -3. 158 .0017
NC -5.892579 4.437046 -.029726 -1.328 . 1849
ND 1 . 432222 1.239519 . 007225 1. 155 .2486
OH -17.486491 7. 158217 -.088213 -2.443 .0150
OK. 4.713540 1.992319 . 023778 2.366 .0185
OR 7.812197 2.486788 .039410 3. 141 .0018
PA -12.658556 7.645236 -. 063858 - 1 . 656 .0985
RI -190.855839 24.832243 -.962794 -7.676 .0000
SC -7.758701 3.910926 -.039140 -1.984 .0479
SD .381177 1 . 054985 .001923 .361 .7181
TN -10.261805 3.513915 -.051767 -2.920 .0037
TX 33.783829 3.729552 . 170426 9.058 .0000
UT 4.982014 1.951881 .025132 2.552 .0111
VT -6.368565 2.747066 -.032127 -2.318 .0209
VA .274916 5.854858 .001387 .047 .9626
WA -2.080361 2.308596 -.010495 -.901 .3680
WV -11.284319 2.433581 -.056925 -4.637 .0000
WI . 174358 3.539282 . 000879 .049 .9607
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EQUATION NUMBER 2 DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PERSONAL INCOME

















F = 1700.70322 SIGNIF F = .0000




OL-c:3 i.n 1 nc.
SE B
CUUH I i.UVt
BETA T SIG T
MILPAY , 780307 1.,701037 . 009067 .459 .6466
CIVPAY 1.. 706622 1..671685 .013394 .841 .4005
PROCCON d •,571299 , 538088 . 115409 6.637 .0000
RDCON —3..729939 1..578318 -.041254 -2.363 .0185
SERVCON -.,995315 2., 348428 -.008780 -.424 .6719
CONSCON -38.. 127364 12..092331 -.039008 -3. 153 .0017
STHEH 15.,957741 ,588991 . 783430 27.093 .0000
STWEL 5.. 995326 1.. 106932 . 158274 5.416 .0000
INCTXPY -73.,331141 22.,601826 -.027437 -3.244 .0013
CORTXPY -142..811390 63..880172 -.019997 -2.236 .0259
MANEMPAG -17.,561440 8.,212321 -.019701 -2. 138 .0330
MANWAGE . 374798 . 430988 . 007520 .890 .3738
PGPDEN 10., 507932 1..067398 .083137 9.844 .0000
(CONSTANT) -..558831 1..826007 -.306 .7597
93
EQUATION 3 DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PERSONAL INCOME
TOTAL DOD EXPENDITURES AS EXPLANATORY VARIABLE
. 99823
R SQUARE . 99646
ADJUSTED R SQUARE .99591
STANDARD ERROR 1.81273
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
DP SUM OF SQUARES MEAN SQUARES
REGRESSION 64 383406.21164 5990.72206
RESIDUAL 415 1363.68330 3.28598
F = 1823. 11366 SIGNIF F = .0000
DURBIN-WATSON = .95726
VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION-
VARIABLE B SE B BETA SIG T
DODTOTAL 4.543232 . 296704 . 308656 15.312 .0000
STHEH 7.017868 . 657498 . 344536 10.674 . 0000
STWEL 4.575003 1,.295928 . 120778 3.530 . 0005
INCTXPY -99.215564 49,.663298 -.037122 -1.998 .0464
CORTXPY -164.367799 62,.738601 -.023015 -2.620 .0091
MANEMPAG -39.238094 23,. 028280 -.042897 -1.660 .0976
MANWAGE -1. 134074 . 967089 -.011754 -1. 173 .2417
POPDEN 212.708888 29,.403601 1 . 683002 7.234 .0000
(CONSTANT) 6. 119346 •J . 990211 1.534 . 1259
YEAR DUMMY COEFFICIENTS
1976 -2.443813 . 486766 -.025895 -5.021 .0000
1977 -2. 154354 . 498935 -.022828 -4.318 .0000
1978 -1.485976 .515089 -.015745 -2.885 .0041
1979 -. 182304 .522421 -.001932 -.349 .7273
1980 -.539701 . 476505 -.005719 -1. 133 .2580
1981 -.963148 . 444428 -.010206 -2.067 .0308
1982 - 1 . 363800 . 393633 -.014450 -3.465 .0006
1933 -1.702323 . 409749 -.018144 -4.079 .0000
1934 -.560869 .408772 -.005943 -1.372 . 1708
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EQUATION NUMBER 3 DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PERSONAL INCOME
STATE DUMMY COEFFICIENTS
VARIABLE B SE B BETA SIG T
AL -9..094819 2.889237 -.045880 -3. 148 .0013
AZ 2.,075129 1.505771 .010468 1.378 .0689
AR -1,,258165 2.660837 -.006347 -.473 .6366
CA -.!> ,964988 5.779136 -.020002 -.686 .4930
CO 3
«
. 7.j'86o-J> 1.661641 .018860 2.250 .0550
CT -128.,644627 18.434769 -.633828 -6.816 .0000
DE -55., 733882 9.504245 -.281156 -5.864 .0000
FL -15. 182977 5.091176 -.076592 -2.982 .0030
GA -8.,724902 3.454201 -.044014 -2.526 .0119
ID 4. 710608 1.817163 . 023763 2.592 .0099
IL ,287565 5.931444 -.011540 -.386 .6999
IN -14. 527842 4.670040 -.073287 -3. Ill .0020
lA 1., 308896 2.410292 . 006603 .543 .5874
KS 6. 184093 1.984210 .016063 1.605 . 1096
KY -10., 633765 3.008886 -.053643 -3. 534 .0005
LA -12. 193612 2.685190 -.061512 -.617 .5378
ME -1.,610311 2.611153 -.008123 -.617 .5378
MD -81. 510218 12.350978 -.411187 -6.599 .0000
MA -139.,601618 21.292178 -.704236 -6.556 .0000
MI -4. 861842 5.041406 -.024526 -.964 . 3354
MN 3.,914582 2.963567 .019748 1.321 . 1873
MS -8. 303913 2.599742 -.041890 -3. 194 .0015
MD -6.,634277 2.540364 -.033467 -2.612 .0093
MT 5. 368113 3.659138 . 027080 3.235 .0013
NE 2_, 458035 1 . 599920 .017444 2. 161 .0312
NV 1. 187699 . 824549 .005991 1.440 . 1505
NH -14.,711172 3.861907 -.074212 -3.809 .0002
NJ -180. 923776 28.648008 -.912690 -6.315 .0000
NM -1., 354408 1 . 263263 -.006832 -1.072 .2843
NY -34. 894913 10.614860 -. 176031 -3.287 .0011
NC -12., 188881 4.684581 -.061488 -2.602 .0096
ND 1. 239770 1.315282 . 006254 .943 .3464
OH -23., 999362 7.362381 -. 121067 -3.260 .0012
OK -1. 375221 1.807602 -.006937 -.761 .4472
OR 8.,979492 2.654984 . 045298 3.382 .0008
PA -23. 682412 7.511856 -. 119469 -3. 153 .0017
RI -184., 178860 26.595630 -.929111 -6.925 .0000
SC -13. 384970 4. 125125 -.067522 -3.245 .0013
SD -.,205213 1. 126076 -.001035 -.182 .8555
TN -10. 995690 3.741125 -.055469 -2.939 .0035
TX 174.,032419 2.354247 .070788 5.960 .0000
UT 600931 1 . 836865 .003031 .327 .7437
VT -5., 118883 2.934801 -.025823 -1.744 .0819
VA -26., 266798 4.069711 -. 132506 -6.454 .0000
MA -s.,283651 2.031857 -.041788 -4.077 .0001
WV -10., 161193 2.601213 -.051259 -3.906 .0001
WI 1..275767 3.773814 . 006436 .338 . 7355
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EQUATION NUMBER 4 DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PER CAPITA INCOME










DF SUM OF SQUARES MEAN SQUARE
REGRESSION
RESIDUAL
69 24 1229682 . 57825
410 9546052 . 46562
3496082.05479
23283.05479
F = 150. 15566 SIGNIF F = .0000





BETA T SIG T
PCMILPAY 1.220218 .898155 . 069858 1.,359 . 1750
PCCIVPAY 2.220552 1., 462570 . 118284 1. 518 . 1297
PCPROCON .780771 ,215928 . 114285 3.,616 .0003
PCRDCON 2.781467 , 843968 . 103240 3.,296 .0011
PCSRVCON . 884669 ,597616 . 030536 1.,480 . 1396
PCCSTCON 2.740127 1. 799392 .019915 1.,523 . 1286
PCSTHEH -.661618 ,388156 -.056502 -1.,705 .0890
PCSTWEL 1.787451 1.,011841 . 088294 1.,767 .0781
INCTXPY --8294.408116 4285.. 739044 -. 121562 -1.,935 .0536
CQRTXPY --11719.55347 5320., 946576 -.064279 -2.,203 .0282
MANEMPAG 9313.914457 2000., 139467 . 409276 4.,657 .0000
MANWAGE 285.996085 84. 678924 . 224766 3.,377 .0008
PQPDEN 2 1 202 .611528 2275.. 125877 6.570914 9.,319 .0000
CONSTANT 4779.689613 363.,561049 13., 147 .0000
YEAR DUMMY COEFFICIENTS
1976 -741.903067 48.,579189 -.307926 -15.,272 .0000
1977 -844.735926 48.. 750232 -.350607 -17.,328 .0000
197S -709.018352 49.,875167 -.294277 -14.,216 .0000
1979 -499.201865 48.. 157948 -.207193 -10..366 .0000
1980 -421.259366 44., 009380 -. 174843 -9.,572 .0000
1981 -440.691010 40.. 346557 -.082908 -10..923 .0000
1982 -472.936420 34.,858724 -. 196292 -13.,567 .0000
1983 -443.011611 35..666713 -. 183871 -12..421 .0000
1984 -258.248763 35., 163568 -. 107086 -7.,344 .0000
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EQUATION NUMBER 4 DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PER CAPITA INCOME
STATE DUMMY VARIABLES
VARIABLE B SE B BETA SIG T
AL -3618..261409 267.. 898039 - .714966 -13.,506 .0000
AZ -1612.,327428 146.,272930 -,. 3 1 8595 -11. 023 .0000
AR -2732.,309110 240.. 783487 - . 539903 -11.,348 . 0000
CA -6875.,482781 417.,016132 -,. 765793 -9. 293 .0000
CO -1164., 360 1 1
8
169.. 927400 - .230077 -6.,852 .0000
CT -147240.98489 1 439
.
,823816 -2,.814010 -9. 891 . 0000
DE -7220., 469878 737., 833809 -1 .426760 -9.,786 . 0000
FL -4553. 568681 432.,363435 -,. 702308 -11. 399 .0000
GA -3554.,201252 311., 806369 -,. 702308 -11.,399 .0000
ID -1485. 407502 171..956722 -,.293516 -8. 638 .0000
IL -4925.,001275 507., 248282 -,.973177 -9.,709 .0000
IN -4938. 734038 405. 690857 -,.975891 -12. 174 .0000
lA -2016., 389735 229,,024068 -,. 398437 -a.,804 . 0000
KS - 1 368
.
649501 186. 595415 -,. 270444 -7. 335 .0000
KY -3664.
,
779907 264., 369407 -,.724158 -13.,862 .0000
LA C»oOwJ • 515821 239. 967601 -,. 659096 -13. 900 . 0000
ME -2645. 931547 246., 106513 -,.522834 -10.,751 .0000
MD -9652. 237962 1004. 364707 -1,.907276 -9. 610 .0000
MA -16475.91464 1687.,068075 -3 . 255630 -9.,766 .0000
MI -4629. 162907 449. 354701 -,.914720 -10. 302 .0000
MN -1710. 098191 276.,069319 -..337914 -6., 194 .0000
MS -3543. 742459 231. 876089 -,. 700240 -15. 283 .0000
MO -3167. 159219 255.,529631 -,.625829 -12.,394 .0000
MT -1183. 718925 158. 990479 -,. 233902 -7. 445 .0000
NE -1192. 589286 161.,255597 - . 235655 -7.,396 .0000
NV -144. 919068 97. 827540 -,. 028636 -1. 481 . 1393
NH — -J>6%j5 . 288643 362., 420543 -..718337 -10.,031 .0000
NJ -21284.95714 2252. 957471 -4,. 205894 -9. 448 .0000
NM -1493. 534271 142.,053376 - .295121 -10.,514 .0000
NY -8 1 35 759633 885. 825247 -1..607621 -9. 186 .0000
NC -4389. 669715 398.,716293 - . 867330 -11.,008 . 0000
ND -731. 657356 127. 216908 -,. 144575 -5. 751 .0000
OH -7073. 469546 624., 294497 -1 .397713 -11., 330 . 0000
OK -2031. 865434 201. 331146 -,.401495 -10.,092 .0000
OR -1412. 499801 256., 985530 - .279109 -5..496 .0000
PA -6840. 544424 641. 222330 -1,.351687 -10.,668 .0000
RI -20532.59072 2073.,011300 -4 .057227 -9..905 .0000
SC -4366. 020354 357. 470315 -,.862723 -12.,214 .0000
SD -1427.,892014 123.,498714 - .282151 -11..562 .0000
TN -4303. 116915 325. 844566 -,. 850293 -13.,206 .0000
TX -2268.,503501 181.,011939 - .448255 -12.,532 .0000
UT -2277. 827383 274. 519160 -,. 450097 -a.,298 .0000
VT -2672., 177654 264.,039204 - .528021 -10.. 120 .0000
VA -4212. 040328 434.,569466 -,.832297 -9.,692 .0000
WA -272.,487856 220.. 978376 - . 538950 -12..343 .0000
wv -3277. 531598 233 ,867502 - .647638 -14.,014 .0000
MI -2960., 982239 350.. 229209 — . 585088 -8..454 .0000
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EQUATION NUMBER 5 DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PER CAPITA INCOME















F = 52.61095 SI6NIF F = .0000
DURBIN-WATSON TEST = .51253
VARIABLE B
loi-ca ifH inc. 1
SE B
CUUH 1 lurM
BETA T SIG T
PCMILPAY 4. 325870 ,811091 . 247656 5. 333 .0000
PCCIVPAY -3., 119881 . 758667 -. 166189 -4., 112 .0000
PCPROCON 1. 439087 ,271139 .210645 5. 308 .0000
PCRDCON o , 206376 1., 025574 .081894 2., 151 .0320
PCSRVCON 4. 014654 1.,359794 . 138576 2. 952 .0033
PCCSTCON -.,910515 4..813838 -.006617 -., 189 .8501
PCSTHEH -1. 087315 , 430330 -.092856 -2. 527 .0118
PCSTWEL 3.,407189 .917553 . 168304 3.,713 .0002
INCTXPY 238. 333708 2665., 363533 . 003493 089 .9288
CQRTXPY -14635.30561 7078.. 764020 -.080272 -2.,067 .0392
MANEMPAG -3277. 021358 969., 095524 -. 144000 -3. 382 .0008
MANWAGE 597., 728227 44.. 647052 . 469758 13.,388 .0000
POPDEN 1273. 760704 128., 143773 . 394752 9. 940 .0000
CONSTANT 2530.,445159 248.. 409647 10., 187 . 0000
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APPENDIX B
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT IMPACTS
This appendix is a summary o-f the predicted effects the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act would
have caused if the cuts forecasted for 1988 had taken place
in 1985. Three policies were tested. Policy one, an
across, the board 6.3 percent cut. Policy two, a 10.5
percent cut with military pay exempted. Policy three, DQD





/. CHANGE IN TOTAL PERSONAL INCOME
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7. CHANGE IN TOTAL PERSONAL INCOME
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